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I. INTRODUCTION
Legislation enacted in 1996 substantially amended Florida's
Administrative Procedure Act (APA or the Act).1 The APA now includes provisions for uniform procedural rules,2 summary proceed4
ings, 3 and additional opportunities to challenge proposed rules. It
5
6
includes new sections on mediation, negotiated rulemaking, and
* Senior Staff Attorney, Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, Florida Legislature. B.A., Florida State University, 1974; J.D., Florida State University, 1977;
M.P.A., Florida State University, 1990; M.S.S.I., Defense Intelligence College, 1991. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are not intended to reflect the
views of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee or the Florida Legislature. The
author would like to thank Professor Johnny Burris and Mr. Greg Krasovsky for their
comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147 (codified at FLA.
STAT. ch. 120 (Supp. 1996)). Clarifying amendments to the Act were added by chapters 96320, 96-397, 96-410, and 96-423, Florida Laws.
2. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (Supp. 1996).
3. See id. § 120.574.
4. See id. § 120.56(2).
5. See id. § 120.573.
6. See id. § 120.54(2).

310

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:309

waiver of rules.7 The entire Act has been renumbered, reorganized,
and simplified." But the most significant change ultimately may
evolve from a series of amendments relating to legislative checks on
the rulemaking process. Although these changes have drawn scant
attention, they alone have the potential to substantially alter the
structure of administrative law in Florida.
This Article reviews the new provisions of the APA that involve
legislative direction and oversight of agency rulemaking in. Florida.
Analysis of these new provisions must be grounded in an understanding of the basic legislative and executive branch prerogatives
with respect to rulemaking. Part II of this Article provides a brief
overview of the principle of separation of powers and Florida's nondelegation doctrine. The new Act's apparently disparate legislative
checks on rulemaking are in fact best understood as elements of a
rather ambitious plan to return mid-level policy formulation to the
Legislature.
Part III considers several new provisions relating to day-to-day
oversight of the rulemaking process. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) has been given new responsibilities. Not
only is JAPC to more closely monitor agency rulemaking, but, for the
first time, it also must establish measurement criteria to evaluate
whether agencies are complying with delegated legislative authority
when adopting and implementing rules. The information gathered
by JAPC may later help the Legislature decide whether to tighten or
loosen some of the new provisions of the Act.
Part IV discusses the controversial "legislative veto," which provides the context for analysis of the new suspension provisions of the
Act. Rule suspension in the APA has been carefully constructed to
avoid any question of constitutionality. The suspension provisions
signal agencies that rule objections have a new importance and bring
information about an agency's refusal to accede to objections made
by JAPC to the attention of the legislative leadership.
Part V examines the new limitations on an agency's power to
adopt rules, the heart of the plan to return mid-level policymaking to
the legislative branch. A brief review of historically competing standards of judicial review sets the stage for the APA's rejection of the
more liberal standard. After analyzing the new standard, this Article
describes the elaborate plan designed to bring existing rules into
compliance.
7. See id. § 120.542.
8. General simplification of the Act closely followed a draft prepared by a working
group organized by the Executive Office of the Governor and endorsed by the Executive
Council of the Administrative Law Section of the Florida Bar. See Donna E. Blanton &
Robert M. Rhodes, Florida'sRevised Administrative ProcedureAct, FLA. B.J., July/Aug.
1996, at 30.
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Part VI discusses the expressed legislative intent to provide more
specific statutory guidance for rulemaking. Inherent pressures exist
that compel the Legislature toward generality. These pressures will
have to be overcome if this effort is to succeed. Recognizing the need
for a more comprehensive revision of statutory delegation provisions,
the new APA prompts legislative reconsideration of grants made in
the past and establishes a review mechanism for the future.
Finally, Part VII concludes that the formidable goal of shifting
the distribution of policymaking authority away from agencies in favor of the Legislature will be difficult to achieve. Meeting this goal
will require effort by agencies, administrative law judges, the courts,
and the Legislature itself.
II. A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM
One major purpose behind the enactment of the APA in 19749 was
to eliminate phantom government 0l by curbing administrative agencies that the Legislature perceived were acting beyond their delegated authority. Twenty years later, many legislators were disappointed with the results. Some were convinced that major amendments were again needed to move toward this elusive goal. 1 In 1994,
each house passed an APA reform bill, but the differences between
them could not be fully resolved prior to the end of the legislative
session." In 1995, a major reform bill passed both houses but was
vetoed by Governor Lawton Chiles. 13 In 1996, portions of the previous year's bill were combined with recommendations of the Governor's Administrative Procedure Act Review Commission 14 and enacted by the 1996 Legislature. The amendments examined here are
best understood as a product of the continuing legislative objective to
constrain agencies from adopting rules beyond their delegated
9. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 74-310, 1974 Fla. Laws 952.
10. A discussion of the 1974 attempt to combine the classical and procedural models
of administration in Florida's APA is contained in F. Scott Boyd, A Traveler's Guide for the
Road to Reform, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 247, 257 (1994).
11. For an argument that major amendments were actually not needed, see Stephen
T. Maher, Getting into the Act, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 277, 282 (1994).
12. For several different perspectives on the 1994 attempts to amend the APA, see
Boyd, supra note 10; Maher, supra note 11; Sally B. Mann, Reforming the APA- Legislative
Adventures in the Labyrinth, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 307 (1994); Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr.,
1994 Proposalsfor Rulemaking Reform, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 327 (1994); David Gluckman, 1994 APA Legislation: The History, The Reasons, The Results, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
345 (1994). At least 17 APA bills were filed in 1994. See A Brief History of Selected APA
Bills in the 1994 Session, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 355 (1994).
13. See Veto of Fla. CS for CS for SB 536 (1995) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec'y of
State Sandra B. Mortham, July 12, 1995) (on file with the Sec'y of State, The Capitol,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
14. See generally GOV.'S ADMIN. PROC. ACT REV. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT (1996)
(proposing recommendations for APA revisions).
15. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147.
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authority. 16 Before examining specific provisions of the new APA,
some background information on the separation of powers and the
delegation of legislative authority must be considered.
A. ConstitutionalLimits
The purpose of separation of powers was best described by James
Madison.17 He wrote, "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative,
executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or
many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."8 Separation of powers
was deeply rooted in the political philosophies of Locke and especially Montesquieu, and was a foundation for the text or interpretation not only of the Constitution of the new nation, but also those of
all fifty of its states. 9 The doctrine continues to shape our legal sys20
tem.
The philosophy of Montesquieu takes form in article II, section 3
of the Florida Constitution: "The powers of the state government
shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No
person belonging to one branch shall exercise any of the powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided
herein.'
The Florida Constitution goes on to vest the lawmaking
power in the two houses of the Florida Legislature.2 2 The constitution provides limited executive involvement in the lawmaking power
in its gubernatorial veto provisions, 23 but contains no grant of quasi24
legislative power to administrative agencies.

16. For a detailed historical review of the Legislature's continuing efforts, see Dan
R. Stengle & James P. Rhea, Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Legislative
Struggle to Contain Rulemaking by Executive Agencies, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 4174.6 (1993).
17. In the FederalistPapers, Madison argued for a flexible conception in the division
of government power to gain support for the Constitution. He later championed an even
more explicit separation of powers amendment based upon the Massachusetts provision.
See Bernard Schwartz, Curiouserand Curiouser: The Supreme Court's Separationof Powers Wonderland, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 590-92 (1990).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 244 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 1988).
19. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. For a good general discussion of
the separation of powers doctrine as a mechanism for restructuring power in the state
constitutions, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 17761787, at 150-61 (1969).
20. The phrase "separation of powers" occurs in 10,741 federal and state cases decided since 1944. Search of WESTLAW, Allcases Database (Nov. 12, 1996) (search:
"separation of powers" & da(aft 1944)).
21. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
22. See id. art. III, § 1.
23. See id. art. III, § 8.
24. Cf. id. art. V, § 1 ("Commissions established by law, or administrative officers or
bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the functions of
their offices.").
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Despite this stringent limitation, Florida courts have found the
delegation of some lawmaking power to administrative agencies inevitable.25 This exception allowing delegated rulemaking is not based
upon conceptual distinction, but upon practical reality. 26 Legislation
cannot be so specific that it anticipates every eventuality and addresses every detail. If government is to work, agencies must have
latitude to "fill in the details" of a statutory program.2 7 The power to
adopt rules is not inherent in the executive branch, however; there28
fore, the Legislature must delegate this lawmaking power.
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court also has stated that
there are limitations on the Legislature's ability to delegate lawmaking power.29 Cases over the years have referred to the need for delegations to contain "an intelligible principle,"30 have "adequate standards to guide the ministerial agency,"' have "objective guidelines
and standards,"' 2 be "accompanied by adequate guidelines" 33 or have
"reasonably definite standards. '34 In a frequently quoted passage on
delegation, the court expressed the limits of delegated rulemaking
25. See, e.g., Jones v. Kind, 61 So. 2d 188, 190 (Fla. 1952) ("It was necessary to delegate the authority and power to effectuate the legislative purpose and policy to some
agency."). In his oft-quoted dissent in INS v.Chadha,462 U.S. 919 (1983), Justice White
stated that "[tihere is no question but that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or realistic sense of the term." Id. at 986 (White J., dissenting).
26. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). "[O]ur jurisprudence has
been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete
with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." Id.; cf. State v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co., 47 So. 969, 982-84 (Fla. 1908).
27. See Department of Legal Aff. v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 269 (Fla. 1976) (Florida's
"little FTC act" not unlawful delegation of legislative authority; agency may flesh out law
to create specific prohibitions); Atlantic Coast Line, 47 So. at 976 (railroad commission
authorization to prevent abuses, unjust discriminations, and excessive charges not unlawful delegation; commission could adopt rules for complete operation of the law).
28. See Grove Isle, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 454 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1984) (administrative bodies have no inherent power to promulgate rules and must
derive that power from a statutory base).
29. See Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So. 2d 815, 819 (Fla.
1983). Professor Johnny C. Burris has termed the Florida courts' treatment of delegation
issues the "pragmatic approach." Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law. 1991 Survey of
Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 7, 11 (1991). He notes that judicial inquiries are "designed
to assure in a minimalistic fashion that the Legislature and not administrative agencies
are making fundamental policy decisions." Id.
30. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1954) (invalidating
municipal zoning ordinance as unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
31. Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 1962) (invalidating
portion of statute delegating authority to alter, restrict, or modify terms of an automobile
transportation brokerage license).
32. High Ridge Mgmt. Corp. v. State, 354 So. 2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1978) (invalidating
statute delegating authority for rating of nursing homes).
33. Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 986 (Fla. 1989) (invalidating legislative delegation
to the court to set substantive sentencing guidelines).
34. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 993 (Fla. 1994) (invalidating statute delegating
agency authority to define restrictiveness levels).
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power: "Flexibility by an administrative agency to administer a legislatively articulated policy is essential to meet the complexities of our
modern society, but flexibility in administration of a legislative program is essentially different from reposing in an administrative body
the power to establish fundamental policy. 13 The purpose of the
statutory guidelines, then, is to establish public policy, so that a
court may have a standard against which to evaluate the agency's
rules. Without such guidelines, the courts proclaim, 3 a statute attempting delegation is itself invalid.
The distinction, however, between establishing public policy and
filling in details is not always easy to see. In one sense, all of the
statutes mentioned above contained some general guideline, but the
statutes were nevertheless invalidated because the Florida Supreme
Court realized that too broad a standard is illusory and delegates the
choice of basic policy to the administering agency.
B.

Policy Concerns

The details routinely left for agency explication are not mere
technical issues without policy impact. The hordes of lobbyists targeting executive branch agencies make it impossible to deny the political nature of agency decisionmaking. This is an inevitable result
of the delegation of power. As Professor Theodore J. Lowi succinctly
put it, "politics will always flow to the point of discretion. 37 The
process restraints of administrative procedure acts have been imposed largely because of the political nature of agency decisionmaking. As one able observer of the administrative process noted,
"[i]ncreasingly, the function of administrative law is . . .the provision of a surrogate political process to ensure the fair representation
of a wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative
decision. ''38 Indeed, the very structure of many agencies reflects a
deliberate attempt to create a politically responsive decisionmaking
process to serve in lieu of specific policy direction from the Legislature. 9 However, a surrogate political process can never be a fully

35. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 920 (Fla. 1979) (invalidating
statute authorizing agency to determine lands subject to protective regime).
36. Professor Burris notes that despite the courts' rhetoric, they seldom find statutes
unconstitutional. See Burris, supra note 29, at 11-12.
37. Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and AdministrativePower, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 297 (1987).
38. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Low, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975).
39. See Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why AdministratorsShould Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). Professor Jim Rossi warns that some of the 1996
amendments to Florida's Act may prematurely legalize the rulemaking process and so undermine the political aspects of rulemaking. See Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised FloridaAd-
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satisfactory substitute for the general consensus possible when the
Legislature itself establishes policy. The imperfect, but still effective,
constitutional structures that pit one interest group against another,
one branch of government against another, one political party
against another, and one legislative house against another, do not
40
operate at the administrative level.
One serious concern is that the delegation of policy questions to
an administrative agency may enhance the power of regulated industries or of other special interests at the expense of the overall
public good. 4 ' This may result from the relatively narrower focus of
the agency on a single area of the law that can make it impossible to
evaluate proposed programs in a broader context. With delegation,
each separate agency controls the political process relating to a given
set of issues, and the interest groups concerned with those issues are
42
able to exert their influence unopposed by more general interests.
In what might be viewed as an attempt to artificially broaden agency
perspective, legislation has been filed in Florida over the years requiring agencies to give specific consideration in their rulemaking to
economic impact, 43 small businesses, 44 family values, 45 and small
46
counties and cities.
ministrative ProcedureAct: A Survey of Major Provisions Affecting FloridaAgencies, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 283, 305 (1997).
40. For a discussion of safeguards against factions built into the legislative process,
see David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional
Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 371 (1987).
41. A number of commentators have asserted "capture" of administrative agencies by
regulated industries or other special interest groups. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 354 (1990); Bernard Schwartz, Of Administrators
and Philosopher-Kings:The Republic, the Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U. L.
REv. 443, 449-50 (1977).
42. See Schoenbrod, supra note 40, at 374. ("Delegation creates balkanization in
which factions can avoid facing each other in one legislative process. Instead we create a
separate administrative process for each major faction.").
43. The APA as enacted in 1974 did not have an Economic Impact Statement (EIS).
The following year, the Florida Economic Impact Disclosure Act of 1975 was passed, see
Fla. CS for HB 874 (1975), but vetoed by Governor Reubin Askew, see Veto of Fla. CS for
HB 874 (1975) (letter from Gov. Askew to Sec'y of State Bruce A. Smathers, June 27,
1975) (on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.). The bill was passed into
law over the veto the following year and became chapter 76-1, Florida Laws. After extensive discussion between the executive and legislative branches, the 1976 Legislature repealed chapter 76-1 and replaced it with a bill containing amendments to chapter 120,
which was signed into law by the Governor. See Act effective July 1, 1976, ch. 76-276,
1976 Fla. Laws 750. Since that time, the EIS requirement has been amended several
times. The EIS was ultimately replaced with the Statement of Estimated Regulatory
Costs. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, § 11, 1996 Fla. Laws 147, 171-72 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 120.541 (Supp. 1996)).
44. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)(a) (1995) (amended 1996). The Legislature enacted a
statute requiring consideration of the effect of rules on small business in 1985 as part of
the Florida Small and Minority Business Assistance Act, ch. 85-104, 1985 Fla. Laws 627.
45. In 1996, Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 424 would have required agencies
to consider the impact of proposed rules on the family. See Fla. CS for SB 424 (1996). The
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The challenge is to decide how much delegation should be allowed. This is an important question. The United States and Florida
constitutions require at least a majority vote of both houses of a representative legislative body and the approval of the chief executive
as a prerequisite to adoption of public policy. This significant hurdle
is not simply a matter of parliamentary procedure. The procedure
reflects a profound understanding that, in the long run, a government that acts to implement policies unsupported by general consensus ceases to be a democracy and will eventually become unstable. The process was not designed to be efficient, but to achieve other
goals, 47 one of which was to prevent the adoption of controversial
policies not enjoying broad public support.48 Delegation of the power
to make policy decisions from a democratically elected legislative
branch to any entity able to act in the absence of consensus reduces
the power of democratic institutions and divorces the government
from the people. 49 One result may be an increase in public frustra50
tion with government arising from perceived lack of control.
C. Statutory Goals
The nondelegation doctrine is used to evaluate statutes." The
doctrine prescribes the maximum extent to which the lawmaking
Bill passed the Legislature, but was vetoed by Governor Chiles. See Veto of Fla. CS for SB
424 (1996) (letter from Gov. Chiles to Sec'y of State Sandra B. Mortham, May 31, 1996)
(on file with Sec'y of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
46. Under a new provision in section 120.54, Florida Statutes, an agency is for the
first time required to consider the impact of its rulemaking upon small counties and small
cities. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(b)(2) (Supp. 1996).
47. For an interesting discussion applying economic analysis techniques to the purpose and effect of logrolling, majority voting rules, and bicameral legislatures, see JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 119-249 (1962).
48. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787 not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.
The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
49. See generally JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978) (reviewing the power of agencies and that
power's effects on the public).
50. Professor Theodore J. Lowi is perhaps the most persistent and articulate advocate of the view that excessive delegation is a major cause of public dissatisfaction with
government, among other ills. See Lowi, supra note 37, at 320. While there are no precise
figures measuring Floridians' specific distrust of their state government, they seem to
share other Americans' general lack of trust in government. See Robert Putnam, A Generation of Loners?, in THE WORLD IN 1996, at 60, 60 (Dudley Fishburn ed., 1995) (reporting that
the percentage of Americans who said that they trusted their government "to do what is right
most of the time" stood at 75% in the 1950s, but has steadily declined, and is barely 20% today). A 1995-1996 poll similarly reports that only 18% of Floridians think one can trust government-local, state, and federal-to do what is right "just about always" or "most of the
INT'L U., FLORIDA POLL RESULTS 67-1 to 67-3 (1996).
time."
51.FLORIDA
See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978).
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power may be delegated to an agency of the executive branch.52 However, while the Florida Constitution authorizes delegation of the
power to adopt rules,53 it does not require it. The cases recognize that
within constitutional limits, delegation is a matter of political choice.
In Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,5 4 the Florida Supreme Court, describing the constitutional provisions assigning lawmaking power to
the Legislature, declared: "We believe that one of the legislative
powers granted by these provisions is the power to determine the
amount of discretion an administrative agency should exercise in
carrying out the duties granted to it by the legislature."5 5 Thus,
Florida may choose to delegate less rulemaking authority to its administrative agencies, or may choose to delegate no rulemaking
authority at all.56 In the new APA, Florida has expressed its intent to
delegate less authority for agencies to formulate policy by rule.57 The
Legislature has created a stricter test to be applied in determining
the validity of agency rules by requiring more specific statutory
authority than that minimally required by the Florida Constitu58
tion.
The new statutory test is applied to rules, not to statutes.5 9 But
the intended effect of the statutory rulemaking provision differs from
52. See id.
53. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the constitutional standards requirement).
54. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
55. Id. at 923.
56. See Commission on Ethics v. Sullivan, 500 So. 2d 553, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
(commission determined to have no authority to adopt substantive rules in absence of
statutory grant).
57. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, 1996 Fla. Laws 147.
58. See id. § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws at 152 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(g) (Supp.
1996)).
59. Given the related purposes of the nondelegation doctrine and certain APA requirements, it is sometimes hard to keep them conceptually distinct. A few cases have
even suggested that the test for constitutionality is somehow altered by the disciplines of
the APA. See Department of Rev. v. Nu-Life Health and Fitness Ctr., 623 So. 2d 747, 751
(Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Albrecht v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 353 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1978); Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1065-67 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977),
aff'd, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978); cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). While the
nondelegation doctrine and the APA share certain policy goals, the idea that the existence
of rules or the APA itself could have any effect upon the constitutional validity of a statute
is difficult to understand. If a statute purporting to delegate the lawmaking power to an
agency is beyond the constitutional power of the Legislature, how can another act (the
APA) passed by that same legislative body increase the Legislature's constitutional
authority? Can the Legislature enact a statute authorizing it to delegate notwithstanding
the constitutional restriction? It is even more bewildering to suggest that the subsequent
adoption of a rule by an agency can somehow "save" an otherwise unconstitutional statute. The constitutionality of a statute delegating authority must depend solely upon the
terms of the statute and the breadth of the constitutional restriction. The test for constitutionality of a statute must remain unaffected by anything that takes place later: the
way the statute may be implemented by an agency; the enactment, amendment, or repeal
of an APA; or the extent to which the statute was "refined" through rulemaking. Cf. B.H.
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the constitutional nondelegation doctrine only in degree, not in direction. The nondelegation doctrine compels the Legislature to enact
more detailed laws in response to judicial invalidation of extremely
broad delegations of legislative authority. The new rulemaking provision is intended to compel the agency to return to the Legislature
for more detailed laws as a response to an invalidation of rules by
the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) based upon very
broad delegations of legislative authority.
This decision to delegate less is a deceptively simple solution to
the perceived problem of administrative agencies exceeding their
delegated authority. In fact, it comes with a host of potential problems. First, unless rulemaking is completely prohibited, some level of
authority for an agency to adopt policy by rule will still exist. It reasonably might be supposed that the very pressures that before resulted (from the legislative perspective) in an agency going beyond
its (larger) grant of authority will still remain. Thus, is it not predictable that the decision to delegate less will similarly result in the
agency going beyond its new (smaller) grant of authority? There
might even be additional excesses as an agency adjusts to the new
stricter standard.
Second, if it were possible to devise a clear test to determine the
point at which an agency exceeds delegated authority, such a test
would have been discovered long ago. A new, more restrictive grant
of delegated authority is unlikely to be much easier to define. A
statutory intent to delegate less may be clear, but the problems inherent in determining exactly where the boundary lies will undoubtedly remain.
A third problem concerns existing rules. Delegation of less
authority to adopt rules has no immediate effect upon the thousands
of administrative rules currently in effect. If they are all simply
grandfathered in as valid rules, the effect of less delegation is tremendously diminished. If they are all declared immediately invalid,
great disruption in government programs results.
Finally, not only must agencies redraft rules, but the Legislature
also must redraft statutes. The concept of less delegation is linked to
the requirement that the Legislature give more policy direction in
enabling legislation. If the Legislature declines to delegate very
broad power, the agency will be unable to establish the mid-level
policy that in the past has been adopted by rule. 60 The burden will
v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 994 (Fla. 1994) ("In simple terms, the language of the statute it.
self wholly fails to give notice of the prohibited act. The fact that an agency rule may attempt to fill the gap is not a relevant concern .... "). This is not to say, of course, that a
constitutional statute may not be applied unconstitutionally.
60. An agency willing to admit that it had no delegated authority to adopt a particu.
lar policy by rule might make the argument that it still had authority to implement the
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then fall on the Legislature to provide this guidance if the legislative
program is to be effectively implemented. This may be difficult for
the Legislature. Also, there is again the problem of existing statutes.
Must they all be repealed or rewritten to provide additional guidance? What process should the Legislature use to review existing
statutory delegations?
In the provisions discussed in this Article, the Legislature has
tried to address some of the problems mentioned herein and has accepted the challenge of returning mid-level policy formulation to the
Legislature. It is indeed a formidable dream.

III. MEASURE FOR MEASURE
The 1996 amendments to the APA and to the statute governing
the operation of the JAPC6 ' attempt to improve legislative oversight
of the rule adoption process. JAPC already is active in this func63
tion,6 and the amendments do not fundamentally change its role.
JAPC has new responsibility to establish measurement criteria, "
65
and certify that
maintain a continuous review of agency procedure,
66
inquiries.
committee
to
responded
has
an agency
A. Measurement Criteria
The Legislature has long been concerned that executive branch
6 7
agencies not exceed their delegated powers when adopting rules.
policy and that the lack of rulemaking power simply proved it was not "practicable" or
"feasible" to adopt it by rule. This argument has a superficial appeal, but the APA does not
define "practicable" or "feasible" in this way. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(a) (Supp. 1996).
Section 120.57(1)(e)(2)(b), Florida Statutes, also expressly provides that an "unadopted
rule" cannot "enlarge, modify, or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented,"
which is exactly the same standard applied to rules and explained in such detail by the
amendments. Id. § 120.57(1)(e)(2)(b). Most importantly, this interpretation of the Act
would be contrary to the overall legislative intent to prevent agencies from going beyond
the bounds of delegated authority to formulate and execute unintended and undesirable
policies. The provisions of former section 120.535, Florida Statutes, are now found in sections 120.54(1)(a), 120.56(4), 120.595(4), 120.80(13)(a), and 120.81(3)(a). See ch. 96-159, §
10, 1996 Fla. Laws at 160-61; id. § 16, 1996 Fla. Laws at 182-83; id. § 25, 1996 Fla. Laws
at 196; id. § 41, 1996 Fla. Laws at 208-09; id. § 42, 1996 Fla. Laws at 211.
61. See FLA. STAT. § 11.60 (Supp. 1996).
62. Chapter 74-310, Florida Laws, created JAPC, required agencies to file rules and
supporting documents with JAPC, gave JAPC the authority to object to certain rules, and
required agencies to respond to those objections. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch.
74-310, §§ 1, 2, 1974 Fla. Laws 952, 958, 972 (codified as amended at FLA,. STAT. §§ 11.60,
120.54(3)(a)(4), .545 (Supp. 1996)).
63. For a discussion of the new rule suspension procedures, which might be considered a new function for the committee, see discussion infra Part IV. For a discussion of
the committee's new responsibility to review statutes authorizing agencies to adopt rules,
see discussion infra Part VI.
64. See FLA. STAT. § 11.60(2)(m) (Supp. 1996).
65. See id. § 11.60(2)(1).
66. See id. § 120.54(3)(e)(4).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 9-16.
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However, it is hard to determine exactly when and to what extent
Florida agencies exceed delegated authority. Constituents bombard
their legislators with specific tales of abuse,6 8 but these complaints
provide little information of a systemic nature. It would be easier to
determine if periodic adjustments to Florida's administrative law
system were needed if there were a more structured and continuous
monitoring process in place.
One step toward implementing a monitoring process for the exercise of administrative powers is found in section 11.60, Florida Statutes. This section now provides that JAPC shall "[elstablish measurement criteria to evaluate whether agencies are complying with
the delegation of legislative authority in adopting and implementing
rules."6 This will be a difficult task. The nature of the criteria and
the means of collecting data 70 are not yet clear. 71 Still, several preliminary observations are possible. First, the phrase "measurement
criteria" suggests some sort of quantitative yardstick against which
agency rulemaking can be evaluated. Such a measure could never be
completely objective, but nevertheless it could provide a valuable tool
to indicate agency and statewide trends.
Second, the statute directs the committee to measure agencies'
compliance with authority not only in adopting, but also in implementing rules. 2 Concern with implementation of rules is relatively
new ground for JAPC. In the past, JAPC oversight has focused on
the adoption of rules, not on how a rule is actually implemented after
it has been adopted. This may prove to be the most challenging part
of the new assignment.
Most importantly, the new requirement indicates a desire to establish a statistical measure of compliance with delegated authority.
While the measure is likely to be crude, it still should provide a
valuable supplement to the anecdotal information that has to this
point been the only information available for legislative considera-

68. In response to a perceived rise in constituent complaints, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Agency Rules and Administrative Procedures was established
in late 1992 to investigate citizen interaction with agencies and prepare necessary legislation. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 7 (Org. Sess. 1992). The Select Committee held a number of
public hearings throughout Florida that elicited numerous complaints about agency administrative actions. The following year, the Senate created a Senate Select Committee on
Governmental Reform, which was given a similar mission. See Mann, supra note 12, at
309.
69. FLA. STAT. § 11.60(2)(m) (Supp. 1996).
70. JAPC is sent detailed information from the agency on each rule that is adopted,
see id. § 120.54(3)(a), receives copies of all rule challenge petitions filed, see id. §
120.56(1)(c), and may request additional information from an agency, see id. § 120.545(2).
JAPC may determine that it also needs to seek information from other sources.
71. At the time this Article was being prepared for publication, JAPC had not yet examined this problem.
72. See FLA. STAT. § 11.60(2)(m) (Supp. 1996).
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tion. In directing JAPC to adopt these criteria, the Legislature has
expressed a desire to have more information about what happens after a statute is passed and an agency adopts its rules. Whatever criteria are adopted, they will undoubtedly be refined over time. One
factor that might reasonably be included would be the number of
complaints reviewed by JAPC.
B. Review of Complaints
JAPC is required to examine each proposed rule73 and is authorized to examine any existing rule. 74 JAPC has always welcomed information and comments from any person about a specific rule or
about the rulemaking process, either in a particular case or a more
general setting. 7 If a rule is determined to violate the criteria set
forth in section 120.545(1), FloridaStatutes, it is JAPC's responsibility to object.76 JAPC cannot decline to do so based upon the source of
the information leading to examination of the rule. 77 In this sense,
JAPC has always received citizen complaints. Section 11.60(2)(1),
Florida Statutes, now also requires that JAPC "[m]aintain a continuous review of the administrative rulemaking process, including a
review of agency procedure and of complaints based on such agency
procedure. ''7 JAPC review of a rule has always included a review of
the procedures followed when adopting the rule. This review ensures
that all statutory requirements were met. However, the first phrase
of the new statute seems to place more emphasis on the rulemaking
process itself than on the review of any particular rule.
Complaints about agency rulemaking procedure will certainly include complaints about procedures that were not violations of any
specific statutory rulemaking requirement. The new charge to JAPC,
therefore, slightly expands the concern of JAPC beyond violations of
legally required procedures. An agency following all required procedures can still generate complaints from people who believed the
procedures were inadequate to address their concerns, failed to give
them sufficient opportunity for participation, or were simply unfair.
While these individuals may have no immediate legal recourse,
JAPC can at least document their concerns.
This emphasis on the overall rulemaking process, as well as the
phrase "continuous review," may be intended to provide a constant
73. See id. § 120.545(1).
74. See id.
75. On numerous occasions, citizen complaints or concerns about a rule have
prompted JAPC to review existing rules. Occasionally, these reviews result in formal rule
objections.
76.

See FLA. STAT.

§

77. See id.
78. Id. § 11.60(2)0).

120.545(1) (Supp. 1996).
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source of information upon which to base possible future changes to
the APA. JAPC may wish to include the results of its continuous review as part of its annual report."
C. Certification
In conducting its examination of an agency rule, JAPC frequently
sends comments and questions 0 to the agency. These comments and
questions alert the agency that JAPC has concerns about the rule.
Often, the agency can make technical or substantive changes" and
resolve these potential committee objections before the rule is
adopted. Most agencies promptly respond to letters sent by JAPC,
stating that they agree with the JAPC comment and will change the
rule, that they disagree with the comment and decline to change the
rule, or that they invite further dialogue on the rule to resolve the
concerns. With some complicated rules, numerous letters are exchanged between JAPC and the agency. A few agencies, however,
82
have simply not responded to letters from JAPC.
A provision requiring JAPC to certify that the agency had responded to all JAPC inquiries before a rule could be filed for adoption was included in the vetoed 1995 bill,8 3 and was enacted as part
of the new legislation. 4 Section 120.54(3)(e)(4), FloridaStatutes, now
provides:
At the time a rule is filed, the committee shall certify whether
the agency has responded in writing to all material and timely
written comments or written inquiries made on behalf of the
committee. The [Department of State] shall reject any rule not
filed within the prescribed time limits; that does not satisfy all
statutory rulemaking requirements; upon which an agency has not
responded in writing to all material and timely written inquiries or
written comments; upon which an administrative determination is

79. Section 11.60, Florida Statutes, requires JAPC to submit an annual report and
mandates that certain information be included. See id. § 11.60(2)(O. JAPC is not specifically required to include the results of the continuous review as part of this report. See
id.
80. Section 11.60, Florida Statutes, provides that in reviewing a rule, JAPC must
advise the agency of its findings. See id. § 11.60(2). Section 120.545, Florida Statutes, also
states that "the committee may request from an agency such information as is reasonably

necessary for examination of a rule." Id. § 120.545(2).
81. Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, provides that an agency may make substantive
changes to a rule in response to a proposed objection by JAPC. See id. § 120.54(3)(d)(1).
82. In testimony given before the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Reform
in 1994, Carroll Webb, executive director of JAPC, noted the difficulty in getting a few
agencies to respond to the committee. See Fla. S. Select Comm. on Govtl. Reform, tape recording of proceedings (Feb. 24, 1994) (on file with comm.) (comments of Carroll Webb).
83. See Fla. CS for CS for SB 536 (1995).
84. See Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, § 10, 1996 Fla. Laws 147, 166 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(e)(4) (Supp. 1996)).
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pending; or which does not include a statement of estimated regulatory costs, if required. 55
If the Department of State (DOS) rejects a rule for any reason, there
is no provision in the APA prohibiting resubmission of the rule after
the problem has been corrected. In the meantime, the statutory
deadline for filing rules continues to run."' If the time
expires before
87
DOS accepts the rule, the rule must be withdrawn.
Under the new certification provision, the authority and responsibility to reject the rule is vested solely with DOS and is predicated
upon a factual determination. Regardless of the content or lack of a
certification by JAPC, if DOS determines that an agency has not responded in writing to all material and timely written inquiries or
written comments, then DOS must reject the rule.88 Naturally, the
certification from JAPC will serve as prima facie evidence, and, in
most cases, this will allow DOS to act consistently with the statement in the certification.8 9 However, if contrary evidence appears,
DOS, not JAPC, must make the determination. In rare circumstances,9" this may become a difficult decision.
It is unclear how the requirement that JAPC certify a rule at the
time it is filed will work in practice. Unless JAPC is specifically notified, only the agency is aware of exactly when a rule will be filed.
JAPC will be aware of the earliest date that a rule could be adopted
because it must receive in advance a notice of changes9 1 or a notice
that the rule has not been changed." After this notice, if JAPC has
received responses to all of its comments and inquiries-and has
nothing further to add-it might be possible for JAPC to prepare its
certification. However, it would apparently not meet the statute's requirements to send it to DOS before the rule filing. Also, advance
preparation of the certification would not be possible if there were
85. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(e)(4) (Supp_ 1996).
86. The APA establishes a 90-day time limit on the rule adoption process, which begins to run with notice of a rule in the Florida Administrative Weekly. See id. § 120.54(3).
However, the Act provides for several exceptions and extensions to, as well as the tolling
of, this 90-day period. See id. § 120.54(3)(e).
87. See id. § 120.54(3)(e)(5).
88. See id. § 120.54(3)(d)(4). This is consistent with current practice regarding rule
certifications. For example, if an agency certifies that an administrative determination is
not pending on the rule, but DOS determines otherwise, DOS now rejects the rule notwithstanding the certification. This seems to be in accord with the intent and plain language of the statute.
89. See id. § 120.54(3)(d).
90. For a discussion of what constitutes a "response," see infra text accompanying
note 92.
91. A notice of any substantive changes to the rule must be filed with JAPC at least
21 days before filing the rule for adoption. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(d)(1) (Supp. 1996).
92. A notice that a rule has not been changed or contains only technical changes
must be filed with the committee at least seven days prior to filing the rule for adoption.
See id. § 120.54(3)(d)(1).
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unanswered letters that still might receive responses in the time
remaining before filing. The certification process will work most efficiently if the agency filing the rule will notify JAPC of the exact
date of filing.
More esoteric questions also may arise. What are "material and
timely" comments and inquiries? It seems self-evident that the usual
correspondence from JAPC regarding a particular rule would be material. Still, agencies may wish to keep the issue in mind because the
requirement to respond does not arise if comments and inquiries are
not material. Dispute seems more likely over the question of timeliness.
In approaching the timeliness issue, two thoughts come to mind.
First, the requirement seems to be for the benefit of the agency, and
usually should be considered from that perspective. Second, in routine rulemaking, timeliness seems to be relative to the deadlines for
filing the rule. An agency may not reasonably be expected to immediately respond to comments and inquiries received on the eightyninth day if taking time to do so would cause them to miss the filing
deadline and force them to begin rulemaking anew. On the other
hand, comments and inquiries received on the thirtieth day after
notice should not be considered untimely just because an agency had
planned on filing the rule on the thirty-first day, as there is no requirement that the agency do so. Because JAPC has always received
prompt written responses from the vast majority of agencies and
maintains a professional working relationship with them, these issues can undoubtedly be resolved in most cases.
Other issues concern the requirement that there be a response.
The modifying phrase "in writing" does not seem too hard to understand, or too burdensome, although it will require adjustment in the
practice of a few agencies. But exactly what does it mean to respond?
It is not reasonable93 to suggest that an agency has not responded to
JAPC comments just because the agency disagrees with JAPC's position and declines to change its rule. The agency is compelled to respond to JAPC, not to adopt its point of view.9 4 At the other extreme,
an agency cannot be said to have responded simply because a return
letter was received. As a simplistic example, consider a JAPC inquiry as to the day on which the public hearing was held and a re93. The legislative history of the provision-coming as a response to the problem of
some agencies simply refusing to answer letters from the JAPC, see supra note 82 and accompanying text-should refute any suggestion that a response requires the agency to accede to the views of the JAPC regarding a particular rule.
94. The word "respond" is often used to refer to a positive reaction. This connotation
of the word in the APA might raise constitutional issues. Direct legislative control over
the content of executive agency rules by a committee could constitute lawmaking without
compliance with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of the constitution. See
infra Part IV.A 1.
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turn letter with the answer "blue." Classification of this as a legitimate response would defeat the entire purpose of the new provision.
The problem is not limited to such extreme examples because failure
to respond to the content of an inquiry need not be intentional. When
numerous issues are raised, as is often done by JAPC, it is easy to
overlook one. But if an agency makes a good faith effort to address
all comments and inquiries raised and JAPC quickly points out any
failure to respond to an issue, disputes should seldom arise.
Finally, DOS is directed to reject the rule if the agency has not responded in writing to all material and timely written inquiries or
written comments.95 No specific reference is made to comments and
inquiries from JAPC. While the use of identical language leaves no
room to doubt that JAPC's comments and inquiries are included, the
duty to reject appears broader. If the courts were to confirm such an
interpretation, an agency would have the duty to respond to correspondence from the general public.

IV. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
The new APA legislation does more than effect relatively minor
changes to JAPC's oversight of rulemaking. The legislation creates,
for the first time in Florida, a process to legislatively suspend an
agency rule. Before reviewing these provisions, an examination of
the contentious legal debate surrounding legislative veto and suspension powers is necessary.
A. Controversy
As discussed above, the separation of powers doctrine has been
found flexible enough to permit the delegation of legislative power to
agencies in the form of rulemaking.9 However, the result has been
less than satisfactory to many legislative bodies. They are convinced
that agencies have gone beyond the bounds of the delegation to formulate and execute unintended and undesirable policies. In an effort
to stop these perceived excesses, legislative bodies have tried many
remedies, but have found most to be ineffective. One proposed remedy legislators have found attractive is the legislative veto.97
95. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(d)(4) (Supp. 1996).
96. See discussion supraPart II.A.
97. Several states employ legislative veto or legislative suspension provisions. See
ALA. CODE §§ 41-22-23, -27 (1995) (joint committee suspends proposed rules; rule is reinstated sine die unless a joint resolution sustains the committee suspension); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 4-170 to -171 (1995) (joint committee disapproves proposed and existing rules;
legislature may reverse disapproval by resolution, has a constitutional clause); IDAHO
CODE § 67-5291 (1996) (standing committees in each house review rules; a concurrent
resolution may reject, amend, or modify a rule); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/5-115(b) (West
1996) (jointcommittee statement on proposed rule does not allow filing for 180 days; legis-
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Constitutionality of
I

the

The basic concept of a legislative veto is quite simple. If an administrative agency adopts a rule that the legislature doesn't like, the
legislature vetoes the rule, much as the President or a governor vetoes legislation. A legislative suspension does the same thing, but is
often effected by only a part of the fall legislature and is temporary.
Actual implementation of this concept has proved to be considerably
more difficult. The legislative veto is often held to be a violation of
the same "flexible" separation of powers doctrine that initially allowed the legislature to delegate the power. Decisions invalidating
the legislative veto essentially conclude that the veto is an exercise
of the lawmaking power and therefore must involve the entire legislature and the chief executive, notwithstanding that the more extensive power to craft the same rule in the first place can be carried
out without their participation. This logic has confounded more than
one member of the bench,98 and dissents and splits of judicial

lature's joint resolution forbids filing); IOWA CODE § 17A.8 (1996) (joint committee may
delay the effective date of proposed rule; rule is effective sine die unless joint resolution
disapproves the rule; has a constitutional clause); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:969 (West
1995) (legislature may suspend or nullify rule by concurrent resolution); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 24.252 (1996) (joint committee may suspend rule promulgated during the interim
between regular sessions until the end of the next regular session; has a constitutional
clause); MINN. STAT. § 3.842 (1995) (joint committee suspends proposed and existing rules;
rule is reinstated sine die unless a bill to repeal the rule is enacted into law); MO. REV.
STAT. § 536.037 (1995) (joint committee may suspend rules of administrative hearing
commission; grant of rulemaking authority declared nonseverable from this power); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 119.031 (Banks-Baldwin 1996) (joint committee suspends proposed
rules; rule is reinstated after each house has five floor sessions unless invalidated by joint
resolution); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120 (Law. Co-op. 1995) (proposed rules submitted to
legislature; rule takes effect 120 days later unless resolution disapproving rule is filed;
sine die tolls the 120-day period for review); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-26-38 (Michie 1996)
(interim rules review committee may suspend proposed rules until July 1 of the year following the year it would have become effective); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-225 (1996) (all
rules expire on June 30 of following year; upon vote of standing committees of each house,
rule is suspended; resolution of assembly can end committees' suspension); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-6.14:9.2 (Michie 1996) (standing committees of each house, with governor, can suspend
effective date of a rule; rule is effective sine die unless a bill to repeal rule is enacted into
law); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.640 (1995) (joint committee may recommend suspension of
an existing rule to the governor, whose suspension extends to 90 days sine die); WIS.
STAT. § 227.19 (1995) (joint committee suspends proposed rules; rule is effective sine die
unless bill to support objection is enacted into law).
98. As Justice White stated in his dissent in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983):
If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and executive
agencies, it is most difficult to understand Article I as forbidding Congress
from also reserving a check on legislative power for itself. Absent the veto, the
agencies receiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power may issue regulations having the force of law without bicameral approval and without
the President's signature. It is thus not apparent why the reservation of a veto
over the exercise of that legislative power must be subject to a more exacting test.
Id. at 986.
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authority are common. Although opinions on the legislative veto are
inconsistent in their holdings, they do identify a few relevant factors
for analysis.
2. FactorsAffecting the Constitutionalityof the Legislative Veto 9
The first group of factors relates to the structure of the veto process. Statutes may allow veto or suspension of a rule by a committee
or subcommittee of the legislature; 00 they may allow veto by a resolution of a single house of the legislature; 0' they may allow veto by a
resolution to be passed by both houses;10 2 or they may allow veto only
upon passage of a general bill with presentment to the chief execu03
tive.
A second group of factors relates to the state's organic law. One
factor relates to whether the applicable constitution has a strict
separation of powers clause, 0 4 a general clause, 1 5 or only an implied
99. It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a detailed analysis of the judicial
treatment of legislative veto provisions. For a review of some of these cases, see Stengle &
Rhea, supra note 16, at 446-65. One important case decided too late to be included in their
survey is Martinez v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582
(Wis. 1992), in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that joint committee suspension
of administrative rules pending bicameral review by the Legislature and presentment to
the Governor for veto or other action was constitutional. See id. at 587.
100. See Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 587; Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664
S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984) (legislative committee suspension of effective date of administrative
rule unconstitutional); State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 636 (W. Va. 1981)
(statute empowering legislative rulemaking review committee to veto rules unconstitutional); In re Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. 1981) (statute allowing
committee rejection of rules unconstitutional, but dictum says temporary suspension
pending a bill would be constitutional).
101. See Chadha,462 U.S. at 956, 959 (overturning statute allowing either the Senate
or the House of Representatives to countermand administrative decision); cf Enourato v,
New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449, 455 (N.J. 1982) (allowing either house to veto a
proposed building project by failing to approve it).
102. See Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410, 414 (Idaho 1990) (joint resolution to repeal
administrative rule is constitutional); State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769, 779
(Alaska 1980) (annulment of agency regulation by concurrent resolution unconstitutional).
103. See Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 587 (joint committee suspension of administrative
rules pending bicameral review by the Legislature and presentment to the Governor constitutional); see also 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-808 (West Supp. 1996) (providing for congressional
delay and disapproval of major rules).
104. A strict separation of powers clause includes not simply the division of power, but
a further instruction that one branch is not to exercise the powers of the others. There are
34 states with strict separation clauses. See ALA. CONST. art. III, §§ 42, 43; AZ. CONST. art.
III; ARK. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1, 2; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3; COL. CONST. art. III; FLA. CONST.
art. II, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1; IND.
CONST. art. 3, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 1; KY. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 2; LA. CONST. art. II,
§§ 1, 2; ME. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2; MD. CONST. art. 8; MASS. CONST. part 1, art. XXX;
MICH. CONsT. chap. 1, art. III, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1; MO. CONST. art. II, § 1;
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1; N.J. CONST.
art. III, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1; OK. CONST. art. IV, § 1; ORE. CONST. art. III, § 1;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2; TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; UTAH CONST.
art. V, § 1; VT. CONST. chap. II, § 5; VA. CONST. art. III, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1;
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one. 106 Another factor is whether the rulemaking power is considered
essentially an executive power 0 7 or a legislative one."'
A third group of factors relates to the nature of the power being
exercised in the veto. Some veto provisions include the power to
amend,0 9 while others include only the power to negate." 0 Some
statutes require the application of specific criteria,"' while others
are silent as to the grounds for veto. Some veto provisions apply to
all agency rulemaking," 2 while others are applicable only to more
discrete sets of agency action."'

WYO. CONST. art. 2, § 1. The highest courts of four of these states have decided cases on
the legislative veto. See Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990); Legislative Research
Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984); General Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438
(N.J. 1982); Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1982); State ex rel
Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
105. A general separation of powers clause simply divides the power of government
into the three branches. There are six states with general clauses. See CONN. CONST. art.
II; MIss. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.H. CONST. part 1, art. 37; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 6; R.I.
CONST. art. 5; S.D. CONST. art. II. New Hampshire is the only one of these states in which
the highest court has decided a case on the legislative veto. See li re Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981).
106. The United States and 10 states have no explicit separation of powers clause in
their constitutions; separation of powers is implied from the allocation of power to the
branches of government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III; ALASKA CONST. art. 1I, II, IV; HAW.
CONST. art. III, V, VI; N.Y. CONST. art. III, IV, VI; DEL. CONST. art. II, III, IV; KAN.
CONST. art. I, II, III; N.D. CONST. art. IV, V, VI; OHIO CONST. art. II, III, IV; PA. CONST. I,
IV, V; WASH. CONST. art. II, II, IV; WISC. CONST. art. IV, V, VII. The highest courts of
three of these states have decided cases on the legislative veto. See State v. A.L.I.V.E.
Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984); Martinez v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 478 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 1992).
107. Kansas and Kentucky consider rulemaking to be essentially an executive power.
See Stephan, 687 P.2d at 635; Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 918.
108. Idaho and Wisconsin consider rulemaking to he a delegated legislative power. See
Mead, 791 P.2d at 415 ; Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 585.
109. The Kansas Supreme Court invalidated a provision that would have allowed the
Legislature to modify rules by concurrent resolution without presentment. See Stephan,
687 P.2d at 635.
110. See Mead, 791 P.2d at 415. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld a provision allowing
the Legislature only to negate rules, see id., while the West Virginia Supreme Court invalidated a statute empowering a legislative committee only to negate rules, see State ex
rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 636 (W. Va. 1981).
111. The Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly noted that rules could be suspended
only on the basis of one or more of six enumerated reasons, thus the delegation to the
committee permitted no arbitrary action. See Martinez, 478 N.W.2d at 585-86; cf. In re
Opinion of the Justices, 431 A.2d 783, 788 (N.H. 1981) (stating that the legislature could
not delegate its legislative authority to a smaller part of the whole legislature). Application of explicit criteria may increase concerns that the legislative branch has encroached
on the judicial function. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (Powell, J. concurring)
(noting that "Congress impermissibly assumed a judicial function"). The argument that a
legislative veto constitutes a judicial function seems stronger in a situation like that in
Chadha, where the legislative vote directly affects a particular case in controversy,
than when rules of general applicability are involved.
112. The legislative veto by concurrent resolution at issue in General Assembly v.
Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982), applied to all agency rules and was declared unconstitu-
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With so many factors and so many possible judicial approaches, it
is impossible to predict what a Florida court might conclude with respect to a true legislative veto, but it is reasonably safe to predict
that a court would uphold the provisions of section 120.545(10), Florida Statutes. The new suspension process is structured to rely almost exclusively upon traditional legislative powers so as not to encroach upon the executive branch.
B. Modest Amendment
If an agency fails to initiate action to modify, amend, withdraw, or
repeal 14 a rule consistent with a JAPC objection," 5 then under section 120.545(10), FloridaStatutes, JAPC may recommend that legislation be introduced to achieve any of those results." 6 Initiation of
action in the case of a proposed rule refers to the publication of a notice of change or withdrawal" 7 and, in the case of an existing rule,
presumably refers to the first step in the rulemaking process, which
now is publication of a notice of rule development." Legislation may
be recommended if publication does not take place within sixty days
following the objection." 9 Even if publication does take place within
this time, legislation may be recommended if the agency fails to
0
adopt the modified rule"1
or amend or repeal the existing rule12 ' in
good faith. A JAPC recommendation has no effect on the rule itself.
Despite the recommendation, it is clear that the agency remains free
to adopt and enforce the rule, which is neither suspended nor vetoed.
tional. See id. at 448; cf. Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449, 455 (N.J.
1982) (decided by the same court on the same day).
113. See Enourato, 448 A.2d at 445 (upholding a legislative veto limited in its application to discrete projects proposed by the building authority).
114. Modification and withdrawal are applicable to proposed rules, while amendment
and repeal apply to existing rules. See FLA. STAT. § 120.545(3)-(4) (Supp. 1996).
115. The JAPC objection process has not been amended in the new Act, except for
slight changes to the grounds for objection. See id. § 120.545(1)-(9).
116. See id. § 120.545(10).
117. Notice of modification or withdrawal is published in the first available issue of
the publication in which the original notice of rulemaking was published, usually the Florida Administrative Weekly. See id. § 120.54(3)(d)(4).
118. See id. § 120.54(2). It should be noted that no particular length of time between
rule development notice and subsequent rulemaking notice is specified by the APA.
119. See id. § 120.545(10).
120. No further action is necessary after withdrawal and publication. See id. §
120.54(3)(e)(5).
121. As a practical matter, virtually every attempt to change a rule following objection
will involve an existing rule. An objection does not itself halt or delay the rule adoption
process, so even rules that were only proposed at the time of objection are very likely to be
existing by the time an agency attempts to change them. It is true that an agency may
voluntarily toll the 90-day period for filing the rule in response to a proposed JAPC objection under section 120.54(3)(e)(6). However, the 90-day clock resumes when JAPC notifies
the agency that it has completed its review, presumably prior to voting on the objection.
See id. § 120.54(3)(e)(6).
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Thus, none of the constitutional concerns surrounding a legislative
veto come into play at this stage.
JAPC is required to certify the fact of its recommendation to the
agency within five days and may request that the agency temporarily suspend the rule or suspend adoption of the proposed rule pend122
ing consideration of the legislation during the next regular session.
The statute requires that the agency respond to this request within a
set time, advising JAPC either that it will suspend the rule or adoption, or that it refuses to do so. 12 3 If the agency chooses to suspend
the rule or adoption, it must give notice of the suspension in the
124
Florida Administrative Weekly, which activates the suspension.
Failure of an agency to respond within the allotted time constitutes a
refusal to suspend. 1 5 Again, this new provision for voluntary suspension by the agency avoids any encroachment on the executive
authority of the agency. The agency is granted new statutory
authority to suspend a rule or the adoption of a rule under limited
circumstances, but the decision to exercise that option is left to the
agency.
JAPC is directed to prepare the bills to modify or suspend the
adoption of a proposed rule or to amend or repeal a rule. 12 6 While this
is new authority for JAPC, it is certainly nothing controversial. Legislative committees routinely draft bills for the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Upon enactment by both houses, the bill
must be presented to the Governor; thus the procedure meets all
constitutional requirements for passage of any general bill.
While the validity of a general law that modifies, suspends,
amends, or repeals a rule may not be in doubt,"27 the precise effect of
such a law is less clear. If the bill was drafted to suspend a proposed
rule or to repeal an existing rule, there may be few problems," 8 but
what if the bill modifies or amends a rule? DOS is directed to conform the rule in the FloridaAdministrative Code to the enacted law
and to reference the law as a history note. 1 9 Such legislative
122. See id. § 120.545(10)(b)(1).
123. See id. § 120.545(10)(b)(2). An agency must respond within 30 days unless the
agency is headed by a collegial body, in which case it must respond within 45 days. See id.
This is identical to the time provided for agency response to an objection under section
120.545(3).
124. See id. § 120.545(10)(b)(3).
125. See id. § 120.545(10)(b)(4).
126. See id. § 120.545(10)(c).
127. For a contrary view, see T. Andrew Zodrow, The Use of the Legislative Veto in
Florida:A Violation of the Separationof Powers Doctrine, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1996, at 65.
128. It seems unlikely the agency would attempt to enact an identical rule again, at
least not soon after the legislative action, but what if the agency proposes a similar rule?
129. See FLA. STAT. § 120.545(10)(e) (Supp. 1996). Presumably, it would then be effective on the date the law took effect, not on the date DOS conformed the rule. Note that
this would have the effect of making a proposed rule immediately effective.
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amendment creates a hybrid that is neither statute nor rule, and
raises many questions. How is the rule to be amended in the future?
Must it be resubmitted to the Legislature each time? If an affected
party wishes to challenge the particular language passed by the
Legislature, must that be done in court?' 30 Does statutory enactment
of one small portion that is dependent upon the remainder of a rule
for meaning demonstrate tacit legislative approval of the overall
scheme? The Legislature has tried to address some of these questions when ratifying other rules,' 3 ' and it might be wise to do so
again.
The suspension provisions of section 120.545(10) take no constitutional chances. They do not do anything that is not clearly within
legislative authority. Indeed, with the exception of the new grant of
authority to the agency to voluntarily suspend its rule, and to JAPC
to draft bills, the Legislature could have employed just such a suspension process without any amendment to the APA. What, then, is
the real purpose of the new procedures? It seems the amendments
are simply a mechanism to focus legislative attention on disputes regarding the scope of delegated legislative authority. JAPC's experience with this issue makes it the logical choice to draft the bills.
Submission directly to the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives assures that the highest levels of
leadership are aware of the delegation issue, and that its significance is not lost in consideration of the particular subject matter in3
volved.'

1

V. THE TEMPEST
Section 120.536, FloridaStatutes, is the keystone of the new legislative check provisions. 33 Subsection (1) restricts the power of administrative agencies to adopt rules.'34 Subsection (2) sets up a procedure to evaluate existing rules-those already adopted before the
effective date of the law-under this new, more restrictive rulemak-

130. It would seem so, because on what basis could an administrative law judge conclude that it was an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority"? See Occidental
Chem. Agric. Prods., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 501 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
(no exhaustion of administrative remedies required before filing challenge in circuit court
to rule ratified by statute).
131. Statutory ratification and amendment of the controversial criteria for evaluating
compliance of local comprehensive plans, see FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 9J-5 (1996), included specific language on the availability of rule challenge proceedings. See Home
Builders and Contractors Ass'n of Brevard, Inc. v. Department of Comm'y Aff., 585 So. 2d
965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
132. This is not to say that the subject matter is not also important; the bill will undoubtedly be referred to substantive committees.
133. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536 (Supp. 1996).
134. See id. § 120.536(1).
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ing standard. 3 5 Subsection (3) establishes some shields for these existing rules to temporarily protect them from rule challenges based
upon the new standard. 13 G Finally, subsection (4) clarifies that enof any
actment of the new standard shall not require re-evaluation
37
grounds.
other
on
invalid
declared
been
has
rule that
Subsection (1) is best understood as a legislative rejection of a
long line of cases frequently cited and relied upon by administrative
law judges in determining whether rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Before examining the language, then, it is helpful to briefly review 38 the historical struggle of
the Florida courts to determine standards for review of administrative rules.
A. HistoricalRecord
As discussed above, the power to adopt rules is a legislative
power, delegated within constitutional restrictions.' 39 Rules adopted
pursuant to such lawfully delegated authority are valid only if they
are adopted in accordance with prescribed procedures, 40 conform to
controlling provisions of organic and statutory law other than those
relating to the scope and extent of delegated power,' 4 ' are supported
by an adequate factual basis, 4 2 are an appropriate exercise of agency

135. See id. § 120.536(2).
136. See id. § 120.536(3).
137. See id. § 120.536(4).
138. A more detailed look at the troubled evolution of standards of review of rulemaking in Florida is found in Boyd, supra note 10, at 263-70. The author argues that the
courts have often adopted federal standards of review and not followed the applicable
provisions of Florida's APA.
139. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
140. While a particular enabling statute may establish some procedures, it is section
120.54 that prescribes generally applicable rulemaking procedures. Section 120.52(8)(a)
provides that a rule is invalid if the agency has materially failed to follow these procedures. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(a) (Supp. 1996).
141. An otherwise valid rule obviously may not violate the Due Process Clause or any
other constitutional provision. Section 120.52(8)(d)-which itself has a constitutional basis-and the new section 120.52(8)(g) are examples of additional statutory restrictions
unrelated to the scope or extent of the power delegated by the enabling statute.
142. An otherwise valid rule is invalid if it cannot be factually supported. See Agrico
Chem. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 365 So. 2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Consideration of the empirical basis of a rule has been most often subsumed under the
"arbitrary and capricious" rubric, which also is applicable to the exercise of agency discretion within the confines of delegated authority. In Agrico Chemical, the court declared that a proposed rule was invalid if it was arbitrary. See id. The court went on to
say that "[an arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or despotic." Id.
The Agrico Chemical standard has been cited many times as requiring only this minimum rationality in rulemaking. Section 120.52(8)() of the Act now provides, in accordance with a minority of opinions, that an administrative law judge must invalidate a
rule not supported by competent substantial evidence. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(f)
(Supp. 1996).
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discretion,14 and are within the scope and extent of the power delegated by the Legislature. Concern here is only with the last of these
requirements.
While the courts have employed a wide array of standards 44 to
determine whether a rule is within the power delegated to an agency
by its enabling statute, two have been preeminent. The first is that a
rule cannot "enlarge, modify, or contravene the provisions of a statute. ' 145 The second is that a rule must be "reasonably related to the
purposes of the enabling legislation.' ' 46 In generally comparing these
two standards, one can immediately see that while the first relates
to the provisions of a statute, the second relates to the purposes of a
statute. This alone is a significant distinction.
Many statutes include a section containing a statement of purpose or intent. 47 However, a statute almost never consists solely of
such a statement. Rather, a statute customarily includes many other
143. Exercise of agency discretion is customarily reviewed under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. While it has a broken and confused pedigree, the common use of this
standard in Florida stems from FloridaBeverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1975). Under the federal APA, the highly deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard is used to review both the factual support and the exercise of policy discretion in informal agency action such as most rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). The same
has most often been true in Florida. Now that two standards are listed under section
120.52(8), "competent substantial evidence" presumably will become the standard for
evaluation of issues concerning the factual basis of a rule, while "arbitrary and capricious"
will be reserved as the standard of review for questions of discretion. These are not easy
to separate, and administrative law judges and courts have understandably often failed to
clarify which they are reviewing. More confusion may lie ahead.
144. See, e.g., Department of Ins. v. Great Northern Insured Annuity Corp., 667 So. 2d
796, 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (applying reasonable basis standard to statutory classifications); American Ins. Ass'n v. Department of Ins., 657 So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
(not in accord with delegated authority); Department of HRS v. Johnson and Johnson
Home Health Care, Inc., 447 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (inconsistent with statutory criteria); North Am. Publications, Inc. v. Department of Rev., 436 So. 2d 954, 955
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (interpretation clearly erroneous). Sometimes numerous standards
are cited. See Board of Optometry v. Florida Soc'y of Ophthalmology, 538 So. 2d 878, 884
(Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (agency cannot exceed its authority; construction of a statute not
overturned unless clearly erroneous; cannot enlarge, modify, or contravene statute; reason.ably related to purpose of enabling legislation; permissible interpretation of statute
must be sustained). Often no explicit standard is invoked in a decision. See, e.g., Packaging Corp. of Am. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 596 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. lst DCA 1992).
145. The standard was first stated in this express tripartite formula in Department of
Business Regulation v. Salvation Ltd., 452 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
146. This test was adopted from federal law in Florida Beverage Corp. v. Wynne, 306
So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). It was coupled there with the phrase "and [is] not
arbitrary or capricious," which is the standard for review of the factual support and the
exercise of policy discretion in a rule. See id.; see also supra note 143. The standard is almost always expressed with these two parts together, although a case will occasionally
explain the component parts. See, e.g., Department of Correct. v. Hargrove, 615 So. 2d
199, 201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
147. A policy section, like a preamble, is not a part of the substantive portion of the
statute. It is available as an aid to the interpretation and clarification of ambiguous provisions elsewhere in the statute. See 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 20.12, at 97 (5th ed. 1992).
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provisions that establish the particular programs and means to be
employed to achieve the expressed or implied purposes of the statute. Since there are numerous ways to achieve a given purpose, the
provisions of a statute are invariably more specific than its purpose.
Because the standard that a rule cannot "enlarge, modify, or contravene the provisions of a statute" requires a more specific relation
to the statute, one might expect that it would be a stricter standard.
In applying this standard, fewer rules should be found valid. Conversely, the standard that a rule must be "reasonably related to the
purposes of the enabling legislation" does not require such a specific
relation to the statute. One might expect that it would be an easier
standard to meet, so that in applying that standard, more rules
would be found valid. Application of these two standards in Florida
has in fact dramatically followed this pattern. Out of nineteen court
cases applying the "enlarge the provisions" standard, 148 fifteen cases
resulted in invalidation of the rule,'149 while only four cases found the
148. "Enlarge," "modify," and "contravene" occur in the same sentence in 27 Florida
cases decided since 1975. Search of WESTLAW, Florida Cases Database (Nov. 12, 1996)
(search: enlarge /s modify s contravene & da(aft 1975)). However, examination showed
that eight of these were not in fact referring to the standard or were not applying it in the
case under consideration. Other cases actually applying the standard were probably not
identified in the search because of minor variations in wording, but this computer sample
is likely to be representative.
149. See Campus Communications, Inc. v. Department of Rev., 473 So. 2d 1290, 1295
(Fla. 1985) (rule requiring newspaper to be sold to qualify for sales tax exemption modified statute creating exemption); Department of Rev. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 So. 2d 365,
368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (rule including workers' compensation administrative assessment
enlarged or modified statutory provision excluding special purpose obligations); Witmer v.
Department of Bus. & Prof. Reg., 662 So. 2d 1299, 1302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (rule prohibiting corrupt racing practices enlarged statutory provision prohibiting racing of drugged
animals); Garrison Corp., Inc. v. Department of HRS, 662 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA
1995) (rule requiring square footage of some private office space to be calculated in determining smoking area enlarged statute exempting such space); Merritt v. Board of Chiropractic, 654 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (rule defining appropriate medical
treatment to be whatever peer review committee determined it to be enlarged, modified,
and contravened statute defining medically accepted standards); DeMario v. Franklin
Mortgage & Inv. Co., Inc., 648 So. 2d 210, 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (90-day requirement in
Department of Revenue rule not mandatory because it would then enlarge, modify, and
contravene statute governing excess tax sale funds); Hillhaven Corp. v. Department of
HRS, 625 So. 2d 1299, 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (rules implementing budget cuts illegally
ordered by Administration Commission contravened statute requiring actions in compliance with legislative appropriations); Board of Dentistry v. Florida Dental Hygienist
Ass'n, Inc., 612 So. 2d 646, 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (rule allowing licensure of dental hygienists based upon graduation from schools with substantially lower standards contravened statute establishing licensure requirements); Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Manasota-88, Inc., 584 So. 2d 133, 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (rule imposing fee of 50 cents per
page for preparation of records on appeal enlarged or modified enabling statutes); Department of Nat. Resources v. Wingfield Dev. Co., 581 So. 2d 193, 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
(rule requiring continuous physical activity on structures enlarged, modified, and contravened statute granting exemption to facilities under construction); Cataract Surgery Ctr.
v. Health Care Cost Containment Bd., 581 So. 2d 1359, 1364 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (rule requiring submission of data by free-standing ambulatory surgical centers enlarged statutory authority relating to hospitals and nursing homes); United States Shoe Corp. v. De-
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rule to be valid. 150 The application of the "reasonably related to the
purposes" standard in fourteen cases' 51 resulted in invalidation of
only one rule, 152 while the rules in the other thirteen cases were upheld. 153 Most telling of all, perhaps, are three cases in which both

partment of ProfI Reg., Bd. of Opticianry, 578 So. 2d 376, 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (rule
requiring sponsor of apprentice optician to dispense eyewear and keep equipment on
premises where apprentice works enlarges and contravenes the statute on requirements
for sponsors); Board of Trust. of the Int. Imp: Trust Fund v. Board of Prof I Land Surveyors, 566 So. 2d 1358, 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (rule defining ordinary high water line enlarged and modified statutory authority to establish minimum technical standards for
surveys); Board of Optometry v. Florida Soc'y of Ophthalmology, 538 So. 2d 878, 887 (Fla.
1st DCA 1989) (citing various standards, but holding rule that permitted optometrist to
dispense topical ocular drugs without board administered examination was modification of
statute and was invalid); Department of Bus. Reg. v. Salvation Ltd., Inc., 452 So. 2d 65, 67
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (rule requiring restaurant licensee to prepare meals on premises enlarged, modified, and contravened statute setting forth requirements for restaurant license).
150. See Board of Trust. of the Int. Imp. Trust Fund v. Levy, 656 So. 2d 1359, 1362
(Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (rule limiting docks to lesser of 500 feet or 20% of width of water body
in aquatic preserves did not enlarge, modify, or contravene statute permitting docks for
reasonable ingress or egress of riparian owners); Ameraquatic, Inc. v. Department of Nat.
Resources, 651 So. 2d 114, 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (rules defining eradication program
and setting general standards for choice of herbicide did not enlarge, modify, or contravene statutes on aquatic plant management); Stuart Yacht Club & Marina, Inc. v. Department of Nat. Resources, 625 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (rules requiring submission of information and detailing specific equipment to be onsite for fuel spills, but allowing substitution, did not enlarge, modify, or contravene statute requiring cleanup
equipment to be available); Florida Hosp. Ass'n v. Health Care Cost Containment Bd., 593
So. 2d 1137, 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (rule penalizing excessive gross revenues per adjusted admission did not contravene statute requiring penalties to be assessed per day of
admission).
151. "Reasonably related" and "purposes" occur in the same sentence in 40 Florida
cases decided since 1975. Search of WESTLAW, Florida Cases Database (Nov. 12, 1996)
(search: "reasonably related" /s purposes & da(aft 1975)). However, examination showed
that 24 of these were not in fact referring to the standard or were not applying it in the
case under consideration. For a discussion of two other cases see infra notes 156-58. Other
cases actually applying the standard were probably not identified in the search because of
minor variations in expression, but the sample is probably representative.
152. In Grove Isle, Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 454 So. 2d 571
(Fla. 1st DCA 1984), two rules were under consideration; the court found one of these to
be valid and one to be invalid under the "reasonably related to the purpose of the statute"
standard. See id. at 573.
153. See General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067
(Fla. 1984) (rule governing the effect of parent debt of regulated companies on federal
corporate income tax reasonably related to purposes of statute granting power to prescribe fair and reasonable rates); Marine Indus. Ass'n of South Fla., Inc. v. Department
of Envtl. Prot., 672 So. 2d 878, 882-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (rule establishing area for slow
speed boating reasonably related to "frequent sightings" criteria of statute to protect
manatees); Department of Ins. v. Great Northern Insured Annuity Corp., 667 So. 2d 796,
799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (rules regulating association of insurance activity with banking
industry reasonably related to purposes of statute to prevent coercion, unfair trade practices, and undue concentration of resources); Charles E. Burkett & Assocs., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 637 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (rules establishing criteria to
qualify as disadvantaged business enterprise reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation to encourage minorities and women to actively participate in the construction
services professions); Department of Labor & Employ. Sec. v. Bradley, 636 So. 2d 802, 807
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the "reasonably related" and "enlarge the provisions" standards were
cited. In the first, the majority held a rule invalid as amending a
statutory provision, 154 while the dissent argued the rule was reasonably related to the purposes of the statute. 155 In the second, the
majority held a rule valid as being reasonably related to the purposes of the statute,. 6 while the dissent would have found it invalid
because it enlarged, modified, and contravened the statute's provisions.1'5 In the third, portions of a rule were upheld based upon the
"reasonably related to the purposes" standard, while other portions
were held invalid as modifying or amending the statute.5 8 The fact
that application of one standard or the other is apparently so predictive of the outcome might give rise to a suspicion that they are not
really employed as standards at all, but rather as justifications.
Consciously or unconsciously, the choice of a standard may not precede evaluation of the rule, but in fact may be determined after the
decision on whether to uphold the rule is made on other, less welldefined grounds.
(Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (rules providing for reimbursement for "physical reconditioning"
services reasonably related to statutory purpose to deliver "medically necessary" services
to injured workers); General Motors Corp. v. Department of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 625
So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (rule establishing one-year time limit on motor vehicle
dealer license reasonably related to purposes of maintaining competition, providing consumer protection and fair trade); Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Envtl.
Reg., 603 So. 2d 1363, 1370 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (rule establishing minimum standards for
management and disposal of domestic waste water residuals reasonably related to purposes of statute to control and prohibit pollution of the air and water and to develop and
implement a solid waste management program); Fairfield Communities v. Florida Land
and Water Adjudicatory Comm'n, 522 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (procedural
rules governing development of regional impact appeals reasonably related to statutory
duty to attach conditions and restrictions to its decision to grant or deny permission to develop); Hobe Assoc., Ltd. v. Department of Bus. Reg., 504 So. 2d 1301, 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA
1987) (rule listing specific types of amendments to prospectus that were possible without
consent of mobile home park occupants reasonably related to purposes of statute regulating mobile home parks); Florida Waterworks Ass'n v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 473 So.
2d 237, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (rules on "contributions-in-aid-of-construction" reasonably
related to purposes of statute to allow PSC to set standards for service-availability
charges); Board of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
(criteria selected by Board of Medical Examiners for licensing of previously unlicensed
persons "by endorsement" of persons licensed elsewhere reasonably related to purposes of
licensing statute); Roberts v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n, 424 So. 2d 64, 65
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (rule setting method for Commission to rate attempted crimes reasonably related to the purposes of statute); Florida Beverage Corp., Inc. v. Wynne, 306
So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (regulation providing for cooperative or pool buying
by liquor vendors had reasonable relationship to the purposes intended by the Legislature).
154. See Rabren v. Board of Pilot Comm'rs, 497 So. 2d 1245, 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
155. See id. at 1251 (Zehmer, J., dissenting)
156, See General Motors Corp. v. Department of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 625 So. 2d
76, 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
157. See id. at 80 (Booth, J., dissenting).
158, See Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 534
So. 2d 419, 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
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It also is possible that circumstances other than the decision of
whether to uphold the rule dictate the choice of a standard. Even
though both standards, by their own terms, attempt to measure a
rule against the scope and extent of the power delegated by the
enabling act, administrative law judges and the courts may find it
impractical or impossible to apply a particular standard in some
situations. One immediate thought is that the "enlarge the provisions" standard cannot be applied in some instances precisely because there are no specific provisions that can be reasonably identified as the law being implemented by the rule. 5 9
Regardless of the reasons dictating the choice of a standard, if the
standard is determined before a rule is considered against its requirements, two points are clear. First, the initial choice of a standard is vitally important. Second, the "enlarge the provisions" standard is considerably more strict than the "related to the purpose"
standard.
After a review of case law, 60 the Legislature in 1987 enacted subsection 120.52(8), FloridaStatutes, defining "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."' 6' The legislation listed several independent grounds for administrative law judges to apply in evaluating a rule. In paragraph (c) of that subsection, the Legislature codified the "enlarge the provisions" standard discussed above as the
standard to be applied by administrative law judges. 6 2 Significantly,
the Legislature did not codify the "related to the purpose" standard.
Two years after the 1987 amendments, with the decision in Adam
Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Regulation,13 one might have supposed that the "related to the purpose"
standard would have largely disappeared. If administrative law
judges followed the direction of section 120.52(8), and courts re159. In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Psychiatric Society, Inc., 382 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), the court, in rejecting the argument that
the "reasonably related to the purposes" standard should be applied, stated: "The first difficulty we have with the Department's argument is the absence of specific 'enabling legislation.' " Id. at 1283. Under these circumstances, section 120.536(1), FloridaStatutes, now
provides that the agency has no power to adopt the rule. See infra text accompanying note
170.
160. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 710 and SB 608 (1987) Staff Analysis 2-3
(rev. Apr. 15, 1987) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.)
(explaining that section 120.52(8)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), represents a codification of
some of the standards that had been applied by courts in determining the validity of
rules).
161. Act effective Oct. 1, 1987, ch. 87-385, § 2, 1987 Fla. Laws 2316, 2318.
162. See id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(c) (Supp. 1996)).
163. 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The Adam Smith court, on appeal of a
DOAH rule challenge proceeding, determined that it had before it for review the administrative law judge's order, not the agency's rule. See id. at 1274. This determination is in
accord with the APA, which provides that it is the order from DOAH that is reviewable final agency action. See FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1)(e) (Supp. 1996).
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viewed their orders, not the underlying rule, few opportunities to in164
voke the "related to the purpose" standard would seem to arise.
However, some administrative law judges' orders and court opinions
6
continued to apply this standard. .
B. New Rulemaking Standard
In the new APA, section 120.536(1) has been created to read:
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient
to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also required. An agency may adopt only rules that implement, interpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious,
nor shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory
provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further than
the particular powers and duties conferred by
66
the same statute.1

Identical language is found in section 120.52(8), immediately following the paragraphs delineating the independent criteria defining an
"invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority."'67 Because
DOAH's responsibility in a rule challenge proceeding 16 8 is to determine whether a rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority, the new language is a clear direction to administrative
69
law judges. 1
164. Adam Smith clarified that the "reasonably related to the purposes" standard applied
to direct appeals of rulemaking, citing the Florida Supreme Court's often quoted formulation:
, Where -the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an agency
may make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this act, the validity of the regulations promulgated thereunder
will be sustained as long as they are reasonably related to the purposes of the
enabling legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious.
553 So. 2d at 1271 (quoting General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d
1063, 1067 (Fla. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, direct appeals of rulemaking were never that common. With the enactment of chapter 92-166, Florida Laws,
which limited direct appeals to situations in which the sole issue was the constitutionality of
the rule, they became even more rare. The provision has been carried over into the new APA
as section 120.68(9), Florida Statutes. This limitation on the right to direct appellate review
has been held not to be an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. See Baillie v. Department of Nat. Resources, Div. of Beaches and Shores, 632 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
165. See supra note 153.
166. FLA. STAT. § 120.536(1) (Supp. 1996).
167. See id. § 120.52(8).
168. Proposed rules may be challenged under section 120.56(2). Existing rules may be
challenged under section 120.56(3). See id. § 120.56(2), (3).
169. JAPC also is directed to use this same standard in its review of rules. See id. §
120.545(1)(a).
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The first sentence of 120.536(1) states that "[a] grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient to allow an agency to
1 70
adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also required.
This language is apparently intended to stress that under Florida's
APA, a rule is not within delegated authority solely because the
agency has a valid grant of rulemaking power. Under the statutory
scheme,17' a grant of power to adopt rules is certainly required, but
normally should be of little interest.'72 Almost all agencies have a
general grant-usually found in the first part of their enabling statute-which basically states that the agency "may adopt rules necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter."' 73 The first sentence
emphasizes that such a general grant is sufficient to allow an agency
to adopt a rule only when relied upon in conjunction with a specific
provision of law to be implemented that grants particular powers
and duties, which might be found anywhere in that chapter.
The second sentence states that "[an agency may adopt only
rules that implement, interpret, or make specific the particular powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. 17 4 This language is a
restatement of a longstanding APA requirement,'75 but it adds for
the first time that only "particular" powers and duties may be implemented, as opposed, presumably, to "general" ones.
The first part of the third sentence, "[n]o agency shall have
authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably related to the
purpose of the enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious,"'176 expressly directs administrative law judges not to apply the
"reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation" standard discussed above.' 77 Use of the term "only" indicates that a rule
that is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation
and is not arbitrary or capricious may not be adopted without more.
The second part of this sentence, "nor shall an agency have the
authority to implement statutory provisions setting forth general

170. d. § 120.536(1).
171. The APA requires that each adopted rule reference not only the grant of rulemaking authority, but also the section of the law being implemented. See id. § 120.54(3)(a)(1).
172. Grants to agencies of the power to adopt rules are so common in the Florida
Statutes that it is difficult to find a case in which the absence of such a grant has caused a
rule to be declared invalid. One case that did revolve around the absence of such a grant
of rulemaking power was State Commission on Ethics v. Sullivan, 500 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1986). The Sullivan court determined that the APA itself granted all agencies the
power to adopt procedural rules, but that neither the Florida Constitution nor any other
statute granted the State Commission on Ethics any authority to adopt substantive rules.
See id. at 553-54.
173. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 198.08 (1995).
174. Id. § 120.536(1) (Supp. 1996).
175. See id. § 120.54(3), (6).
176. Id. § 120.536(1) (Supp. 1996).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 146-65.
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legislative intent or policy,"'7 8 further instructs administrative law
judges that in the absence of more particular statutory provisions,
the power to adopt rules may not be exercised to implement general
declarations of intent or policy 179 found in the statutes.
The final sentence states that "[s]tatutory language granting
rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers and functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further than the
particular powers and duties conferred by the same statute.' 180 This
sentence further clarifies that only express powers and duties conferred upon an agency may be implemented, interpreted, or made
specific through rulemaking. 18' The language appears to have been
adapted from the dissent in a recent case of the First District Court
of Appeal.'18 The majority determined that a general rulemaking
authority grant to "adopt such rules as it deems necessary or
proper"'8 13 and the general power to regulate the "licensing of motor
vehicle dealers and manufacturers"'1 4 allowed the agency to adopt a
rule creating an automatic expiration of a granted license after one
year.'86 The dissent maintained that the particular powers and duties were not assigned by the rulemaking grant, but by more specific
sections of the statute, such as section 320.642, FioridaStatutes.8 "
These more specific sections of the statute established the procedures governing the license application process. Though the statute
contained a twelve-month delay after denial before reapplication was
allowed, there was no section of the statute that even remotely implied that the agency could impose a time limit on the license.""
Thus, the dissent concluded that the agency could not rely upon the
general grants to create such a requirement."' The language of section 120.536(l) is a clear endorsement of the approach reflected in
178. FLA. STAT. § 120.536(1) (Supp. 1996).
179. This one sentence uses the terms "purpose," "intent," and "policy." One commentator suggests that purpose is a broader concept than intent because it entails an examination of the surrounding circumstances leading to the determination of the legislative
objective to be sought. See Alexander Dill, Comment, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After
Chadha: A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?, 33 EMORY L.J. 953, 978-79 (1984). The APA
amendments seem to use these three terms interchangeably, and this Article makes no
attempt to draw any distinction between them.
180. FLA. STAT. § 120.536(1) (Supp. 1996).
181. This is not a novel concept. See 1 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 42 (1962)
('General language describing the powers and functions of an administrative body may be
construed to extend no further than the specific duties and powers conferred by the same
statute.").
182. See General Motors Corp. v. Department of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., 625 So. 2d
76, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (Booth, J., dissenting).
183. FLA. STAT. § 320.011 (1995).
184. See id. § 320.605.
185. See GeneralMotors, 625 So.2d at 78.
186. See id. at 79 (Booth, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 80.
188. See id. at 79-80.
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the dissent. The powers and duties of an agency that may be implemented are only those particularly granted by sections of a statute;
rulemaking grants and general descriptions of functions of the
agency cannot be used to expand these particular powers and duties.
The four sentences of 120.536(1) are potentially the most farreaching of any in the 1996 amendments. They are a simple but
clear rejection of the concept that a mere statement of legislative
policy or purpose coupled with a broad grant of rulemaking power
constitute sufficient authorization for agency rulemaking. Policy
choice, involves not simply what ends are to be sought, but what
means are to be employed to get there. Few, indeed, disagree that it
is desirable to have clean air and water, economic prosperity, and
good public health.'89 Rather, given limited resources, the controversies arise over the choice of programs. The true formulation of basic
policy occurs in determining the approach to achieving these universally shared goals.' It is these mid-level policy decisions that require compromises and involve the most difficult political choices.
Thus, even though it is constitutionally permitted to do so,' the
Legislature declined to delegate the authority for agencies to implement the general intent or policy language 9 2 that commonly appears
in the statutes. The new APA explicitly rejects the review standard
that would uphold an agency rule because it is "reasonably related to
the purposes of the enabling legislation." In evaluating rules, administrative law judges are not to apply the extremely deferential standards minimally required by the separation of powers or the void-forvagueness doctrines, but rather a stricter test imposed by the statute.19 3 Rules cannot implement statutes that merely describe ends to
be sought, but only statutes that describe specific programs and

189. In arguing for stricter application of the nondelegation doctrine in Florida, Judge
John Fennelly has decried the courts' validation of what have been termed "aspirational"
statutes, which direct an ambitious objective to be achieved without providing any standards for accomplishing it. See John E. Fennelly, Non-Delegation Doctrineand the Florida
Supreme Court: What You See is Not What You Get, 7 ST. THOMAs L. REV. 247, 275-76
(1995).
190. One commentator has noted that the constitutional responsibility of Congress is
unfulfilled if legislation leaves basic "normative" issues unanswered. See Ernest Gellhorn,
Returning to First Principles,36 AM. U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1987).
191. An argument can be made that administrative law judges and courts in Florida
have generally reviewed rules under those minimal standards that are constitutionally
required. That is, they have assumed the legislative intent was to delegate the maximum
authority constitutionally permissible. The new amendments clearly establish a stricter
statutory limit, and direct administrative law judges to invalidate any rule exceeding it.
192. The difficulty will lie in determining which statutory provisions assign particular
duties to an agency and which merely describe general intent or policy.
193. It is clear that Florida is free to apply stricter standards. The constitutional tests
establish the minimum statutory standards that must be present, and so allow the maximum amount of delegation, but the state may choose to delegate less by requiring stricter
standards. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58.

342

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:309

means to those ends. Rules may be adopted only if there is both a
grant of rulemaking authority and a specific law to be implemented
that details particular powers and duties.
C. Rules on the Books
Section 120.536(2) demonstrates legislative understanding that
the new rulemaking standard established in section 120.536(1) represents a fundamental change in Florida administrative law. Section
120.536(2) establishes an elaborate three-year plan designed to bring
the nearly 25,000 existing rules in the Florida Administrative
Code9 4 into compliance with the new standard.
The statute places the initial burden of evaluating existing rules
on agencies themselves. Each agency is to divide all of its existing
rules into two categories: those that exceed the new rulemaking
authority and those that do not. If the agency can identify a statutory section assigning the particular powers and duties being implemented, interpreted, or made specific,' 95 the rule meets the new
standard. Any rule or portion of a rule for which this cannot be done
is to be included on a list to be submitted to JAPC by October 1,
1997.196 If only part of a rule exceeds the new rulemaking authority,
the list also is to identify the violating portion. 197 Agencies are given
a full year to complete their reviews.
JAPC is to submit the combined lists of all of the agencies to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 9 ' This will give the Legislature the opportunity during the
1998 Regular Session to consider all of the rules that the agencies
have determined exceed the new rulemaking authority. If the Legislature finds that the rules contain wise public policy, it may pass
specific provisions of law to provide statutory support for the rules
under the new rulemaking standard. 9 ' Alternatively, if the Legislature finds that the policies contained in the rules can be improved, it
may pass different provisions of law providing guidance in that direction, or it may pass nothing at all, leaving the rules unsupported
200
by any authorizing legislation.
At the close of the 1998 Regular Session, the agencies will begin
to amend their rules, if necessary, to conform them to the specific
statutory provisions passed, or to repeal those rules submitted on
194. Author's estimate as of October 1, 1996.
195. The FloridaAdministrative Code contains statutory citations to the "rulemaking
authority" and "law implemented" following each rule.
196. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536(2) (Supp. 1996).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
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the list for which no statutory authority was enacted into law. 0 1 The
statute directs that all of these repeals are to be initiated no later
than January 1, 1999.102 JAPC is directed to submit a report to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives by February 1, 1999, identifying any rules without authority
that the agencies have not yet begun to repeal.20 3 A special right for
JAPC or any substantially affected person to petition an agency to
repeal a rule which exceeds the new rulemaking authority standard

is granted beginning July 1, 1999.204
D. Rule Challenge Shields
As noted earlier, the language establishing the new rulemaking
standard in section 120.536(1) also is to be found as part of the definition of "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. '20 5 As
part of this definition, the new standard is to be applied by administrative law judges in rule challenge proceedings. Rules filed for
adoption 20 6 with DOS on or after October 1, 1996,207 are immediately
subject to the new standard. Thus, the law is expressly given a retroactive effect in the sense that the new rulemaking standard is to
be applied 20 8 to all rules noticed before October 1, 1996, but filed for
adoption on or after that date.

201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. This new provision does not seem substantially different from the normal
petition to initiate rulemaking-which also may consist of a request to repeal a rulecontained in section 120.54(7). One difference is that the new provision expressly extends
the right to petition for the repeal of a rule to the committee. It also should be noted that
the Act's definition of "agency action" specifically includes the denial of a petition under
section 120.54(7), but does not expressly mention denial of a petition under this new section. See id. § 120.52(2). The courts seem likely to consider such a denial to be final agency
action for the purposes of section 120.68, even without an express inclusion in the definition.
205. See id. § 120.52(8).
206. The initial sentence of section 120.536(3) uses only the term "filed," but it is clear
that the statute is referring to the filing for adoption. First, final adoption is the only time
a rule is actually filed. Earlier submissions of rule notices to DOS for publication in the
FloridaAdministrative Weekly do not technically constitute a filing of the rule. Second, in
reading the remaining portions of section 120.536(3), it is clear that the overall statutory
plan is to eventually bring all rules under the new rulemaking standard. It would not be
reasonable to conclude that the legislative intent was instead to create a small group of
rules-those initially noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly prior to October 1,
1996, but not filed for adoption until after that date-that would remain forever unaffected by the new rulemaking standard because they would be neither immediately subject to it nor covered by it upon expiration of either of the two temporary shields.
207. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536(3) (Supp. 1996).
208. See id. The new rulemaking standard of section 120.536(1) is effective for the
purposes of rule challenge proceedings under section 120.56 and JAPC review under section 120.545. See id.
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The new amendments temporarily protect all rules filed for adoption before October 1, 1996, from challenges based upon the new
rulemaking standard. 20 9 The length of time these rules are protected
depends upon whether they are included on the list submitted to
JAPC. As shown in Figure 1, rules210 included on the list are covered
2"
by the long shield and are protected from challenge ' until July 1,
1999.12 The long shield thus lasts for almost three years from the effective date of the new APA, allowing the Legislature to consider the
listed rules during the 1998 Regular Session, the agency to amend
and repeal its rules in response to this legislative action, and the
Legislature to act again during the 1999 Regular Session. Rules not
included on a list are covered by the short shield and are protected
from challenge only until November 1, 1997.213 This shorter protection, lasting a little over one year, is given to allow the agency to examine all of its rules under the new rulemaking standard. Rules that
the agency concludes do meet the new standard are not included on
submitted, and the shield over them expires
the list when it is
1
shortly thereafter.' 4
VI. AS YoU LIKE IT
The new provisions are not exclusively restraints on agency
authority. The 1996 APA reflects an understanding that the Legislature itself must be more specific when enacting enabling legislation.
It may seem, at first, that nothing could be easier than for the Legislature to write the statutes exactly as it likes. If there is too much
delegation in the statutes, they can simply be written to delegate
less. However, when the inherent institutional pressures that make
specificity so difficult to achieve are considered, the task seems more
daunting. It is helpful to consider some of these pressures briefly before moving to consideration of three mechanisms in the new law
designed to help focus legislative attention on the need for more
specific delegations.
209. See id.
210. Section 120.536(2) refers to "a listing of each rule, or portion thereof' that exceeds
the new rulemaking standard, and section 120.536(3) "shields" every rule "included on a
list." Id. § 120.536(2)-(3). It appears, then, that the shield extends only to the portion of a
rule that is included on a list, and not automatically to the entire rule section.
211. The shield is only effective to prevent section 120.56 rule challenges based upon
the grounds that the rule exceeds the new rulemaking standard. See id. § 120.536(2). Rule
challenges may continue to be filed based upon any other criteria set forth in section
120.52(8). The shield does not appear to protect against an objection to the rule by JAPC,
which under section 120.545(1)(a) also is required to apply the new rulemaking standard.
JAPC does have authority to review any existing rule under section 120.545(1), although
such reviews are not common.
212. See id.§,120.536(3).
213. See id.
214. See id.
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FIGURE 1
DURATION OF TEMPORARY "SHIELD"
Against Challenges Based on Failure to Meet New Rulemaking Standard
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A.

Pressures

One pressure compelling delegation of lawmaking authority involves the specialized expertise held by an administrative agency. 215
Expertise is acquired through the very process of administering.
Agencies are required to apply the law within a relatively narrow
area of responsibility to the realities of the everyday world. They
have scientific and technical staff that understand the factual basis
behind public policy approaches and are able to determine operative
facts as questions arise during implementation of a law.
215.

One of the earliest, and perhaps the best, of the proponents of the "expert agency"

was JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). This conception of the administra-

tive state was predicated upon the theory that legislative enactments identified objectives to
be promoted, but that it was the agency, utilizing its subject matter expertise, that was best
able to select from among the range of means to achieve these objectives. See id. at 23-26.
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Legislatures are not unaware of their relative institutional ineffectiveness in addressing highly scientific and technical questions.
The particular specialized knowledge or scientific competence sometimes required to implement a program is not a matter suited for
216
political debate and is often irrelevant as a matter of public policy.
Rather than allow legislation to become bogged down through the
inclusion of inconsequential detail, legislators may choose to leave
such matters to the technical experts. Legislators may then focus on
making basic policy decisions on behalf of the constituents they were
elected to represent.
A related, but distinct, pressure to delegate stems from the relatively greater flexibility that an agency has in addressing problems
that arise. The real world to which an agency must apply the law is
changing. New technological, sociological, political, and economic developments constantly alter the problems that government regulation attempts to address.21 Amendment of a statute by a legislature
that meets in a sixty-day regular session each year does not allow for
a great deal of flexibility. Special sessions can be called to address
major problems, but this is not a realistic solution for more routine
issues. Amendment of rules is more flexible. Rule amendments can
be drafted in response to new circumstances and can be adopted at
any time during a year. 18 Administrative agencies thus are better
able to adapt policy to changing conditions as they are encountered
or anticipated.
A third pressure contributing to delegation is the desire to ease
the often difficult process of passing legislation. One expedient solu216. For a discussion of the concept of "administrative science" and the procedural reform reaction, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory Reform and the Positive State: An
Historical Overview, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 399, 403 (1986).

217.

Agency flexibility in applying policy is described as a principle favoring determi-

nation of questions by agencies rather than by the judiciary. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2088 (1990).
218. A related debate involves the question of flexibility within the realm of agency

policy. After responsibility for certain policy determinations has been delegated to an
agency, a subsidiary question arises as to how much of this policy must be adopted as
rules and how much may be applied as agency nonrule policy. This issue has been much
debated in Florida. See Johnny C. Burris, The Failureof the FloridaJudicialReview Process to Provide Effective Incentives for Agency Rulemaking, 18 FIA. ST. U. L. REV. 661
(1991); Patricia A. Dore, Florida Limits Policy Development Through Administrative Adjudication and Requires Indexing and Availability of Agency Orders, 19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 437 (1991). The Governor's proposal to repeal the statutory requirement that agen-

cies adopt as rules all policies that they are applying was criticized in Stephen T. Maher,
The Death of Rules: How Politics is Suffocating Florida,8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 314 (1996).
The 1996 legislation retained Florida's strict requirement that all agency policy must be

adopted as a rule as soon as it is feasible and practicable to do so, see supra note 60, but
created a new waiver provision to allow added flexibility, see Blanton & Rhodes, supra
note 8, at 32. The discussion in this Article involves the earlier determination of how
much lawmaking authority is to be directly exercised by the Legislature and how much is

to be delegated to an administrative agency.
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tion to immediate political impasse in the legislature is simply to
relegate the contentious policy decision on which no agreement is
possible to an administrative agency to resolve in rulemaking. The
more general the provisions of a bill, the greater the likelihood that a
majority will support it; disagreements arise if a bill is made more
specific. Thus, the solution to dispute often lies in intentional generality. Legislators can retain the level of generality necessary to ensure majority support, and then rely upon the agency to use rulemaking authority to fill out the policy, hopefully in accordance with
their unexpressed desires. This pressure to avoid the celebrated evil
of gridlock is certainly understandable, but it raises serious concerns
in light of our constitutional structure.1 9 Our democratic institutions
were designed precisely to ensure that policies unable to command
majority support would not become the policy of the state.220
Another pressure for delegation has been suggested with the assertion that legislators find it in their political interest to pass vague
legislation because they can then blame agencies for unacceptable
results.2 ' Economic models have been employed in an attempt to
demonstrate that with broadly worded statutes, legislators can claim
credit for the agency's specific implementation with those constituents pleased with the results, while at the same time denying responsibility with those constituents unhappy with the agency's actions.222 If delegation does in fact allow legislators to shift responsibility for political decisions, this might create a powerful incentive to
delegate, especially in the most controversial policy areas.
B. Mechanisms
If delegation is to be restricted, it might be necessary to bolster
the legislature's ability to resist these subtle inherent pressures toward generality in legislation. The Florida Legislature recognized
that special mechanisms could be created that would help focus legislative attention on delegation issues. The Legislature first resolved
219. As Judge Skelly Wright once put it, "[a]n argument for letting the experts decide
when the people's representatives are uncertain or cannot agree is an argument for paternalism and against democracy." J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81
YALE L.J. 575, 585 (1972).
220. See supratext accompanying note 48.
221. See Schoenbrod, supra note 40, at 373.
222. See Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or
Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982). Another commentator, himself a legislator at the time, harshly but concisely expressed one aspect of this phenomenon in this
way: "[There is] growing evidence of a perverse symbiotic relationship between legislators
and agencies. This symbiotic relationship not only tolerates but, ironically, may even require legislators to create bureaucratic monstrosities against whose foreseeable excesses
they can protest to their political gain." David B. Frohnmayer, The Oregon Administrative
ProcedureAct: An Essay on State Administrative Rulemaking ProcedureReform, 58 OR. L.
REV. 411, 459 (1980).
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to consider these issues with respect to proposed legislation. Section
1 of chapter 96-159, Florida Laws, not codified in the Florida Statutes, provides:
It is the intent of the Legislature to consider the impact of any
agency rulemaking required by proposed legislation and to determine whether the proposed legislation provides adequate and appropriate standards and guidelines to direct the agency's implementation of the proposed legislation.223
This language does not require the Legislature to take any particular action, 2 4 but it does demonstrate an understanding that the adequacy of statutory standards is directly related to the delegation
problem.
Even if all future legislation 'were to be carefully drafted to include specific guidance to implementing agencies, and thus avoid excessive delegation, concerns would remain with existing statutes. After all, the perceived problems of the past with agency actions exceeding delegated authority occurred under existing statutory language. The responsibility of each agency to review its rules and
submit a list of those without authority under the new rulemaking
standard 2 1 provides one mechanism for the Legislature to examine
existing statutes. The rules included on the list may well express
good policies that the Legislature will wish to validate. New statutory language can be enacted to more clearly authorize the agency to
do what it has already done. On the other hand, in the event the
Legislature determines that the agency rule policy is ill-advised, or if
it prefers another policy, it can enact more specific legislation giving
that direction. Some existing statutes will be reviewed under this
ratification process. As for rules not included on the list, the rule
challenge provisions 2 6 should occasionally compel some agencies to
return to the Legislature to seek more specific provisions of law to
implement.

223. Act effective Oct. 1, 1996, ch. 96-159, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 147, 149.
224. It is possible that the Legislature might choose to create formal procedures to
consider whether proposed legislation contains adequate and appropriate standards and
guidelines for an agency. The Governor's Commission recommended that staff analysts
discuss this issue. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 17. Similar requirements have
been placed in legislative rules. For example, both the Senate Rules and the Rules of the
House of Representatives require that a bill contain a fiscal analysis when reported favorably by a committee. See Fla. S. Rule 3.13 (1996); Fla. H.R. Rule 7.16 (1996). It may be
unlikely, however, that rule provisions will be created. An earlier draft of the Committee
Substitute for Senate Bills 2290 and 2288 would have created section 11.0751, Florida
Statutes, requiring legislative consideration of delegated authority, but this was replaced
with the current "intent" language during passage. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 746 (Reg. Sess.
1996).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 194-204 for a discussion of section 120.536(2).
226. See FLA. STAT. § 120.56(3) (Supp. 1996).
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Chapter 96-159, Florida Laws, also constructs a more methodical
process to review statutes delegating rulemaking authority. Chapter
159 creates section 11.60(4), FloridaStatutes, which provides:
The committee shall undertake and maintain a systematic and
continuous review of statutes that authorize agencies to adopt
rules and shall make recommendations to the appropriate standing committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives as
to the advisability of considering changes to the delegated authority to adopt rules in specific circumstances. The annual report
submitted pursuant to paragraph (2)(0 shall include a schedule for
the required systematic review of existing statutes, a summary of
the status of this review, and any recommendations
provided to
227
the standing committees during the preceding year.
This section creates an entirely new role for the JAPC. While it has
long examined rules adopted pursuant to delegated authority, JAPC
has never before had a responsibility to make recommendations to
standing committees regarding the statutes delegating that authority.
It is still too early to know what form this systematic and continuous review will take. The fact that a schedule is to be established
suggests that existing statutes will have to be divided into smaller
groups to be reviewed over time. JAPC might decide to organize the
review by statute number, simply beginning at the front of the statute books and moving through to the end. Another possibility would
be to divide statutes by implementing agency, scheduling all of the
statutes that a single agency implements for consecutive review,
then moving on to the next agency's statutes.
"Systematic" and "continuous" also are broad enough to include,
in addition to the scheduled reviews, consideration of delegations of
authority in conjunction. with JAIPC's usual rule review process. As
each agency proposes new rules and amendments, JAPC must carefully examine the statutes cited as rulemaking authority and as law
implemented. This would appear to be an excellent opportunity to
consider the statutory delegation, as well as the rule, and to make
any recommendations to the appropriate standing committees.
Whatever the form of this statutory review, it will provide the
Legislature for the first time with a mechanism to routinely evaluate
statutory delegations in light of the rules the agency actually
adopted to implement them. At the time a statute is originally enacted, consideration given to delegation is necessarily abstract-it is
impossible to anticipate all possible contingencies and constructions.
After an agency has adopted or attempted to adopt rules, it becomes
easier to conduct a review of the statute and identify delegations
227. Id. § 11.60(4).
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that might be clarified. Chapter 96-159 creates a statutory review
mechanism to ensure that this is done in a regular and orderly
fashion.
VII. ALL'S WELL THAT ENDs WELL
Taken together, these legislative check provisions have the potential to substantially change the structure of administrative law in
Florida. The heart of these amendments, section 120.536, Florida
Statutes, restricts agency power to adopt rules. The other provisions
are designed either to monitor or enforce this restriction, or to assist
the Legislature in its corresponding duty to enact more specific laws.
Under the new APA scheme, the goals set forth in statements of
general legislative intent or policy are no longer capable of supporting rulemaking. It is no longer sufficient that a rule be reasonably
related to the purposes of the statute. Only statutes granting particular powers and duties may be implemented through rulemaking.
The goal is for agencies to stop formulating mid-level policies, and
for the Legislature to begin doing so. It is an ambitious undertaking,
opposed by natural political forces and one strand of Florida's legal
tradition. It is by no means clear that it will succeed. It is problematic because it involves so many different players in Florida's administrative law system.
Agencies will have to prepare lists of existing rules that are in
need of more specific authority for submission to the Legislature.
They will have to keep the new stricter rule standard in mind as
they draft rules and, perhaps even more importantly, as they draft
proposed legislation, for the law will now have to include more definite policy standards and guidance.
Administrative law judges will have a critical role, for they will
initially apply the new rulemaking standard. Should they fail to require that every rule be supported not only by a rulemaking grant
and general statutory purpose, but also by specific laws being implemented that set forth the duties and programs to be carried out
by the rule, then the entire legislative scheme will fail.
Courts, too, will have to give effect to the legislative intent to
delegate no rulemaking authority in the absence of detailed policy
guidance within the statute. They will have to abandon the
"reasonably related" standard. Courts hearing rule challenge appeals must review the administrative law judge's order, not the rule,
and uphold it unless it contains a conclusion of law which is erroneous or a finding of fact unsupported by competent, substantial evidence.
The greatest burden, however, may fall upon the Legislature. It is
the Legislature that ultimately must overcome inherent institutional
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resistance, make the difficult mid-level political decisions, and express these policies in statutes assigning particular powers and duties to the agencies. It is the Legislature that must quickly respond
to unanticipated problems that may arise as programs are implemented.
One of American administrative law's greatest struggles has been
to decide what is to be done when the legislative branch fails to
speak clearly and comprehensively. Some have vehemently insisted
that only the judiciary has the power to declare what the law is.
Others have as strongly maintained that the courts must defer to
whatever the agency decides. These issues will remain, but Florida's
APA now suggests that a third option is preferable when important
mid-level policy decisions are at issue. The new legislative check
provisions, operating in concert, urge the possibility that policy not
clearly established in the statute should simply not be enforced until
it is clarified by the Legislature itself.

